source-to-image VS runc

You can try and use s2i (source to image) - https://github.com/openshift/source-to-image You deploy container to your cluster that produce another image

Surprised to see it supports source-to-image (S2I). If you're using S2I, you're likely using OpenShift where your development pipeline is figured out for you. You wouldn't be using Shipwright on that platform.

If that's not an option, I unfortunately don't know how to compile source code into an IMG file from github, but I have a feeling that there's quite a few people who are knowledgeable in these matters lurking around this subreddit. The only thing I found was this: https://github.com/openshift/source-to-image but I have no idea how or where exactly to execute the code outlined in the readme below. Looks promising though.

Source-To-Image (S2I) is a toolkit for building images directly from source code without Dockerfile. This tool works well for simple, expected scenarios and workflows but quickly becomes annoying and clumsy if you need little too much customization or if your project doesn't have the expected layout. You might consider using S2I if you are not very confident with Docker yet or if you build your images on OpenShift cluster, as builds with S2I are a built-in feature.

I can speak to this. Containers, and by extension k8s, break a well known security boundary that has existed for a very long time - whether you are using a real (hardware) server or a virtual machine on the cloud if you pop that instance/server generally speaking you only have access to that server. Yeh, you might find a db config with connection details if you landed on say a web app host but in general you still have to work to start popping the next N servers.

That's not the case when you are running in k8s and the last container breakout was just announced ~1 month ago: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/G... .

At the end of the day it is simply not a security boundary. It can solve other problems but not security ones.

It's interesting that, in light of things like this, you still see large software companies adding support for new components written in non-memory safe languages (e.g. C)

As an example Red Hat OpenShift added support for crun(https://github.com/containers/crun) this year(https://cloud.redhat.com/blog/whats-new-in-red-hat-openshift...), which is written in C as an alternative to runc, which is written in Go(https://github.com/opencontainers/runc)...

Rabbit hole indeed. That wasn't related to my job at the time, lol. The job change came with a company-provided computer and that put an end to the tinkering.

BTW, I found my hacks to make runc run on Chromebook: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/main...gabrys...

being the main author of crun, I can clarify that statement: I am not a fan of Go _for this particular use case_.

Using C instead of Go avoided a bunch of the workarounds that exists in runc to workaround the Go runtime, e.g. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontaine...

runc

Not OP, but if I had to guess, a lot of this can be picked up by just observing common security issues in the Linux space, since similar mistakes and oversights have caused quite a few real-world CVEs in the past, e.g. this random example of a TOCTTOU vulnerability in runc.