runc VS containerd

I can speak to this. Containers, and by extension k8s, break a well known security boundary that has existed for a very long time - whether you are using a real (hardware) server or a virtual machine on the cloud if you pop that instance/server generally speaking you only have access to that server. Yeh, you might find a db config with connection details if you landed on say a web app host but in general you still have to work to start popping the next N servers.

That's not the case when you are running in k8s and the last container breakout was just announced ~1 month ago: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/G... .

At the end of the day it is simply not a security boundary. It can solve other problems but not security ones.

It's interesting that, in light of things like this, you still see large software companies adding support for new components written in non-memory safe languages (e.g. C)

As an example Red Hat OpenShift added support for crun(https://github.com/containers/crun) this year(https://cloud.redhat.com/blog/whats-new-in-red-hat-openshift...), which is written in C as an alternative to runc, which is written in Go(https://github.com/opencontainers/runc)...

Rabbit hole indeed. That wasn't related to my job at the time, lol. The job change came with a company-provided computer and that put an end to the tinkering.

BTW, I found my hacks to make runc run on Chromebook: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/main...gabrys...

being the main author of crun, I can clarify that statement: I am not a fan of Go _for this particular use case_.

Using C instead of Go avoided a bunch of the workarounds that exists in runc to workaround the Go runtime, e.g. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontaine...

runc

Not OP, but if I had to guess, a lot of this can be picked up by just observing common security issues in the Linux space, since similar mistakes and oversights have caused quite a few real-world CVEs in the past, e.g. this random example of a TOCTTOU vulnerability in runc.

Containerd and nerdctl

Kubernetes on the backend used to utilize docker for much of its container runtime solutions. One of the modular features of Kubernetes is the ability to utilize a Container Runtime Interface or CRI. The problem was that Docker didn't really meet the spec properly and they had to maintain a shim to translate properly. Instead users could utilize the popular containerd or cri-o runtimes. These follow the Open Container Initiative or OCI's guidelines on container formats.

Container Engine: A runtime that executes and manages containers. Docker and containerd are popular container engines.

Multiple container runtimes are supported, like conatinerd, cri-o, or other CRI compliant runtimes.

This is a failed attempt to upstream part of containerd changes: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/8789

Other part of containerd changes waits for gods-know-what: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/9054

But I haven't gave up yet.

containerd is required by kubernetes to handle containers on its behalf. A big thanks to the HostAfrica blog for the information on setting containerd up for debain. So the containerd install will need to happen on both the WSL2 instance and the Raspberry Pis. For WSL2 you can just install containerd directly:

The context deadline exceeded: unknown is also in containerd, and is a known problem.

Get:1 https://download.docker.com/linux/ubuntu focal/stable amd64 containerd.io amd64 1.6.21-1 [28.3 MB]

Docker Desktop adds a bunch of stuff to simplify local development and that’s why it has a larger memory footprint. You don’t use that when deploying but something like https://containerd.io/.