rekor VS fulcio

There could be asset hashes in sigstore: https://sigstore.dev/

Is there a good way to run native mobile app GUI tests with GitHub Actions?

A VM/container emulator like anbox, waydroid, (or all of ChromeOS Flex in KVM) in a GitHub Action is probably enough to run GUI tests?

"Build your own SLSA 3+ provenance builder on GitHub Actions"

I expect something like https://sigstore.dev

sigstore is another suite of tools that focuses on attestation and provenance. Within the suite are two tools I heard mentioned a few times at KubeCon: Cosign and Rekor.

Since we can distribute Spin applications using popular registry services, we can also take advantage of ecosystem tools such as Sigstore and Cosign, which address the software supply chain issue by signing and verifying applications using Sigstore's new keyless signatures (using OIDC identity tokens from providers such as GitHub).

With containers being the heart of Cloud Native application development, it has become even more critical to ensure the integrity of the containers. One of the ways to do this to sign and verify the container images.sigstore is a open source project that empowers software developers to securely sign the container images.

https://sigstore.dev - although its really not true to say I built it. I started it off, but very quickly smarter folks then me jumped on board and really took it to all sorts of new directions.

Powered by Wolfi, Chainguard Images are a suite of distroless images that consolidate the base features of the Wolfi undistro into end-user container images that can be integrated into existing workflows. Chainguard Images are fully declarative and reproducible, and include SBOMs that cover all image dependencies. In addition, Chainguard Images are signed via Sigstore, which attests the provenance of all artifacts. All images and corresponding signatures, as well as their SBOMs, are hosted in Chainguard's OCI registry cgr.dev.

What's your thoughts on the sigstore project from the linux foundation?

untrue.

The Root CA is generated by the sigstore community (five folks, two from academia) this is what is used for the trust root for the signing. Right now github exchanges a OIDC token for a sigstore root chained cert.

GitLab are currently adding themselves, to have the same capability.

https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio/pull/1097

They also say thay they integrate with Fulcio which seems to be a self-managing CA. Never tried it, though.

https://docs.sigstore.dev/ :

> sigstore empowers software developers to securely sign software artifacts such as release files, container images, binaries, bill of material manifests and more. Signing materials are then stored in a tamper-resistant public log.

> It’s free to use for all developers and software providers, with sigstore’s code and operational tooling being 100% open source, and everything maintained and developed by the sigstore community.

> How sigstore works: Using Fulcio, sigstore requests a certificate from our root Certificate Authority (CA). This checks you are who you say you are using OpenID Connect, which looks at your email address to prove you’re the author. Fulcio grants a time-stamped certificate, a way to say you’re signed in and that it’s you.

https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio

> You don’t have to do anything with keys yourself, and sigstore never obtains your private key. The public key that Cosign creates gets bound to your certificate, and the signing details get stored in sigstore’s trust root, the deeper layer of keys and trustees and what we use to check authenticity.

https://github.com/sigstore/cosign

> our certificate then comes back to sigstore, where sigstore exchanges keys, asserts your identity and signs everything off. The signature contains the hash itself, public key, signature content and the time stamp. This all gets uploaded to a Rekor transparency log, so anyone can check that what you’ve put out there went through all the checks needed to be authentic.

https://github.com/sigstore/rekor

fulcio is a root CA for code signing certs. Its job is to issue code-signing certificates and to embed OIDC identity into code-signing certificate. From this description we can see that it performs these tasks in steps 2, 3, 4 and 8.

Did you follow the link to the project list on Github? The actual tool for doing the signing, cosign, is just a binary you can install on your device and generate signatures and keys yourself. The "service" part of it seems to just be having your public certificate vouched for by a trusted code signing CA. I don't see anything in the tooling that requires your users to only trust that CA. If you want to sign your cert with your own CA and tell your users to trust that instead, they seemingly can do that, just as you can do that today in browsers. That you can't do it with Firefox extensions and mobile app stores is a limitation intentionally built into the distribution channel. It's not a limitation of PKI itself. iOS, Android, and Mozilla could have chosen to let users install arbitrary trusted CAs. You shouldn't dismiss all PKI based on the fact that a few vendors have chosen to implement it in a crappy way to make walled gardens.

It doesn't say this on the announcement, but looking at the actual PKI service (https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio), it seems to be entirely possible to self-host the service and roll your own CA.