noise
cargo-geiger
noise | cargo-geiger | |
---|---|---|
7 | 30 | |
502 | 1,311 | |
0.4% | 1.1% | |
3.9 | 5.2 | |
3 months ago | 16 days ago | |
Go | Rust | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
noise
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A simple, (as-of-yet unidentified) asymmetric Authenticated Key Exchange
This is Noise IK (possibly with minor differences in the hashing):
https://noiseprotocol.org/
Wireguard uses NoiseIK, plus a static public key for the initiator which is encrypted to the agreed-upon-session-key without adding additional round trips. Your protocol simply omits the parts related to the initiator's static public key, because it has none.
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Show HN: Willow – Open-Source Privacy-Focused Voice Assistant Hardware
With regard to this:
> - On the wire/protocol stuff. We're doing pretty rudimentary "open new connection, stream voice, POST somewhere". This adds extra latency and CPU usage because of repeated TLS handshakes, etc. We have plans to use Websockets and what-not to cut down on this.
I've recently used the Noise protocol[1] to do some encrypted communication between two services I control but separated by the internet.
It was surprisingly easy!
[1]: https://noiseprotocol.org/
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How much secure is my UDP based network protocol?
Rolling your own initial handshake is hard. Right now I strongly encourage you take a look at the Noise protocol framework. Specifically the XK and IK patterns for identified clients, and the NK pattern for anonymous clients. The best security will be achieved by the XK pattern, but if you need to reduce the number of messages to a minimum IK might be a bit more attractive. (Also, if I recall correctly IK is used by Wireguard, so there's an example to follow).
- Noise Protocol Framework
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Rosenpass – formally verified post-quantum WireGuard
Rosenpass author here;
There is a confusion about terminology here I think. Mathematical proofs including cryptography proofs use models simplifying reality; i.e. the real practical system might still be susceptible to attacks despite a proof of security.
For crypto primitives (classic mc eliece, curve25519, ed25519, RSA, etc etc) the standard for proofs is currently showing that they are as hard as some well studied mathematical problem. This is done by showing that an attack on the primitive leads to an attack on the underlying mathematical primitive. The proof for Diffie-Hellman shows that attacking DH leads to an efficient solution for the discrete log problem. I.e. the proof is a reduction to the underlying primitive.
No primitive is perfectly secure (at least a brute force – i.e. guessing each possibility is possible); there is some probability that the adversary can guess the right key. We call this probability the adversary's advantage. One task in cryptoanalysis is to find better attacks against primitives with a higher advantage; if an attack with a polynomial time average runtime is found, the primitive is broken. Finding a higher non-polynomial attack is still an interesting result.
The standard for protocols is proving that the protocol is secure assuming the primitives are secure; since multiple primitives are used you basically get a formula deriving an advantage for breaking the entire protocol. The proof is a reduction to a set of primitives.
We did not build a proof in that gold standard, although we are working on it. We built a proof in the symbolic model – known as a symbolic analysis. This uses the perfect cryptography assumption; i.e. we assumed that the advantages for each primitive are zero. Google "Dolev-Yao-Model".
This makes the proof much easier; a proof assistant such as ProVerif can basically find a proof automatically using logic programming methods (horn clauses).
The definitions of security are fairly well understood; unfortunately there is a lot to go into so I can't expand on that here. Looking up "IND-CPA" and "IND-CCA" might be a good start; these are the security games/models of security for asymmetric encryption; you could move on to the models for key exchange algorithms there. Reading the [noise protocol spec](https://noiseprotocol.org/) is also a good start.
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Whisper: Wraps any Go io.ReadWriter in a secure tunnel using Ed25519/X25519
There is no description of the protocol or of its security goals, so I am making some guesses based on a cursory look at the source and what I imagine this might be for.
A single symmetric key is derived for both directions, and there is no checking of nonces, so as far as I can tell any message can be dropped, reordered, or replayed in both directions. (Including replaying message from A to B as if they were from B to A.)
This is a bit like using ECB and likely to lead to fun application-specific attacks like [0].
This is very much rolling your own crypto, in a dangerous way. I am on the record as being "against" the "don't roll your own crypto" refrain [1], but mostly because it doesn't work: it should discourage people from publishing hand-rolled protocols such as this, but instead people think it means "don't roll your own primitives" and accept the use of "Ed25519/X25519" as probably secure.
Please read about the Noise framework [2] to get an idea of how much nuance there is to this, and consider using a Go implementation of it [3] instead.
P.S. This kind of issue is also why I maintain that NaCl is not a high-level scheme [4]: this could have used NaCl and have the exact same issues. libsodium has a couple slightly higher-level APIs that could have helped, secretstream [5] and kx [6], but again please use Noise.
[0] https://cryptopals.com/sets/2/challenges/13
[1] https://securitycryptographywhatever.buzzsprout.com/1822302/...
[2] https://noiseprotocol.org/noise.html
[3] https://github.com/flynn/noise
[4] https://words.filippo.io/dispatches/nacl-api/
[5] https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/secret-key_cryptography/sec...
[6] https://libsodium.gitbook.io/doc/key_exchange
cargo-geiger
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Was Rust Worth It?
Instead of looking at the crates themselves, you might want to check your (or others') Rust application with https://github.com/rust-secure-code/cargo-geiger to get a sense of effective prevalence. I also dispute that the presence of unsafe somewhere in the dependency tree is an issue in itself, but that's a different discussion that many more had in other sub-threads.
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Found a language in development called Vale which claims to be the safest AOT compiled language in the World (Claims to beSafer than Rust)
There's still plenty. Run cargo geiger on any of your projects and see for yourself.
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Question Omnibus: Dependency Fingerprinting, Unsafe Rust, and Memory Safety
On point 2, the answer is cargo geiger, and judging how much memory safety you need for a given project.
- pliron: An extensible compiler IR framework, inspired by MLIR and written in safe Rust.
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[Discussion] What crates would you like to see?
You can use cargo-geiger or cargo-crev to check for whether people you trusted (e.g. u/jonhoo ) trust this crate.
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How do you choose what crate you will use?
The amount of unsafe code is also a factor. cargo geiger is a handy tool for measuring it.
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Seems legit
We have cargo-geiger that does just that.
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Rosenpass – formally verified post-quantum WireGuard
For that, I believe you need to use cargo-geiger[0] and audit the results.
[0] - https://github.com/rust-secure-code/cargo-geiger
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Hey Rustaceans! Got a question? Ask here (6/2023)!
cargo-geiger is a subcommand you can install which will check all the crates in your dependency graph for unsafe blocks and print out a report (which also shows if a crate has #![forbid(unsafe_code)] or not). You can then inspect those crates' sources to judge their use of unsafe for yourself. I don't think it has a "check" mode that simply errors if your dependency graph contains unsafe though, it's more about just collecting that information.
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[CCS Proposal] Preliminary research on rewriting Monero node in Rust
wrt to memory safety, keep in mind that many rust crates use "unsafe" internally. There are tools available that can find these such as cargo-geiger. So I would suggest to avoid unsafe deps as much as possible. Since they cannot be avoided entirely, it is a good idea to keep a list of unsafe deps.
What are some alternatives?
willow - Open source, local, and self-hosted Amazon Echo/Google Home competitive Voice Assistant alternative
bacon - background rust code check
rosenpass - Rosenpass is a post-quantum-secure VPN that uses WireGuard to transport the actual data.
ziglings - Learn the Zig programming language by fixing tiny broken programs.
FastNoise - Fast Portable Noise Library - C# C++ C Java HLSL GLSL JavaScript Rust Go
nomicon - The Dark Arts of Advanced and Unsafe Rust Programming
imagemagick - haskell imagemagick bindings
mold - Mold: A Modern Linker 🦠
whisper - Wraps an io.ReadWriter in a secure tunnel using modern elliptic-curve cryptography.
miri - An interpreter for Rust's mid-level intermediate representation
matplotlib - Haskell bindings for Python's Matplotlib
orz - a high performance, general purpose data compressor written in the crab-lang