neo VS pm

Neo (3400 GitHub Stars) https://github.com/neo-project/neo

Some discussion that covers many of the arguments on both sides here: https://github.com/neo-project/neo/issues/2118

Take a look at something like https://github.com/neo-project/neo or https://github.com/Felandil/tangle-.net to see how much work is really required just to get something basic up and running.

Yes, this was a topic of considerable debate during N3's development. The degree to which one considers it a serious issue really depends on what one sees as the key features of governance--stability vs. democratic expression, etc. Of course, the basic fact of a node falling out of the top 21 isn't weird; the question is more around how easy it should be to get back in.

It's good discuss the voting mechanism and other aspects of NEO. Have you seen the comments on GitHub? A lot of people and devs (also people ^_^) are there, for example: https://github.com/neo-project/neo/issues/2598

One, there has been quite a bit of discussion over the past year about the design of the new governance system, and its potential flaws with respect to promoting node turnover--e.g. here, but also at various times in this sub (sidebar, you'll see that your "votes are reset" idea was proposed in that thread, say). As an oversimplified TL;DR, I think many--myself included--would agree with you that the system tends to promote the status quo. Where things get muddy is whether that's a feature or a bug. For reasons of both regulatory compliance and stability, the Neo team has intentionally designed a system where turnover, while possible, isn't specifically incentivized; that is, in their view it should happen because there's a strong, governance-related reason for it, not because of financial incentives.

The governance model has been designed to incentivise stability while still allowing flexibility. However, the issue you raise is already being discussed on GitHub here: https://github.com/neo-project/neo/issues/2598

Here: https://github.com/flashbots/pm

In theory you can do this now by exploiting front-running bots, see https://github.com/flashbots/pm/issues/24

Front run + back run is sandwich. Front running has also been called miner extractable value. This is now called maximal extractable value.

You may want to look a little further, or not.

https://github.com/flashbots/pm

'... mitigating the negative externalities of Maximal Extractable Value ...'

2: sponsored transactions. use flashbots to send transactions directly to miners using a third party address as payment.

I know someone who runs a MEV-Bot, i.e. scanning the mempool for opportunities and bribing miners to include his arbitrage-tx into the chain via FlashBots.

> “Less trust, more truth.”

What a neat platitude that means absolutely nothing. As a society, over, oh I don't know, like 5000 years, we figured out the the best way to enforce truth is via some sort of centralized institution: the court of law.

> They could, right. They sort of do—there’s the star thing that you can only do once per day. But guess what? They're a profit-motivated company. So if you pay Tinder enough, you can just send as many stars as you want.

Wait, crypto miners aren't profit-motivated? Maybe we should introduce Mr. Wood to flashbots[1] -- a "sub-network" of Ethereum miners (a fork of geth) who's entire purpose for existing is front-running. Truth as long as you can pay for it -- got it. Web3 is end-stage capitalism and we've been down this road in the early 1900s. Yawn.

[1] https://github.com/flashbots/pm