mescc-tools-seed VS nixpkgs

From here I found a reference to the Gash, Mes-M2 and stage0 projects, who's README.org references a nice wiki for stage0. The Wiki references a more expansive stage0-posix repo. From here, I finally got all the pieces to fit togeather.

Of course, reproducible builds will only give you security if you trust the compiler you're using to verify. Unlike traditional distributions, Guix packages are rigorously defined in terms of their dependencies all the way down to ~60 MB of bootstrap binaries. There has been a lot of cool work to reduce the initial binary seed size, and they are working to reduce this even further to a "full source" bootstrap which will make use of the stage0 project to bootstrap the entire OS from a small, auditable ASCII Hex -> binary program.

stage0-posix just gained initial support for RISC-V (64-bit). It starts with 392 byte hex assembler, 361 byte "shell" and bootstraps simple linker (hex2), macro assembler (M0). Then it builds cc_riscv64 RISC-V compiler written in RISC-V assembly and uses it to build simple C compiler written in C (M2-Planet). Then it builds a few extra utilities (cp, mkdir, untar, ungz, sha256sum, chmod)

I wonder if Brainfuck could be used for https://github.com/oriansj/stage0-posix ? It would not surprise me if there is no other language for which there are so many interpreters written in so many different programming languages. It is even possible to write a Brainfuck interpreter in Brainfuck, which can be verified. And there is also a Brainfuck interpreter written in x86-64: https://github.com/316k/brainfuck-x86-64 . It is a little larger than hex0_x86.hex0 , but not too much to make it hard to verify.

I'd argue the easiest to implement language is macro-assembly then the C subset known as cc_x86

https://github.com/oriansj/mescc-tools-seed

https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/commits?author=neon-sunset

I see two signers in the top 6 displayed on https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/graphs/contributors

For a single file script, nix can make the package management quite easy: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/doc/languages-f...

For example,

```

Yes, Nix doesn't actually ensure that the builds are deterministic. In fact it works just fine if they aren't. There are packages in nixpkgs that aren't reproducible: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/issues?q=is%3Aopen+is%3Aiss...

I'm not familiar with Bazel, but Nix in it's current form wouldn't have solved this attack. First of all, the standard mkDerivation function calls the same configure; make; make install process that made this attack possible. Nixpkgs regularly pulls in external resources (fetchUrl and friends) that are equally vulnerable to a poisoned release tarball. Checkout the comment on the current xz entry in nixpkgs https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/master/pkgs/tools/comp...

NixOS uses a monorepo and I think everyone's love it.

I love being able to easily grep through all the packages source code and there's regularly PRs that harmonizes conventions across many packages.

Nixpkgs doesn't include the packaged software source code, so it's a lot more practical than what Debian is doing.

https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs

In this specific case, nix uses fetchFromGitHub to download the source archive, which are generated by GitHub for the specified revision[1]. Arch seems to just download the tarball from the releases page[2].

[1]: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/3c2fdd0a4e6396fc310a6e...

[2]: https://gitlab.archlinux.org/archlinux/packaging/packages/ib...

True, but irrelevant -- _some packages_, _somewhere_, do depend on xz, which, if built, requires pulling the source from GitHub (see the default.nix: https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs/blob/nixos-23.11/pkgs/tools...)

It's not the vulnerability that's a problem right now (NixOS was protected by a couple of factors) but rather GitHub's hamfisted response.

That is the problem.