libsignal-protocol-c
session-desktop
libsignal-protocol-c | session-desktop | |
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4 | 301 | |
1,348 | 1,415 | |
- | 2.0% | |
0.0 | 0.0 | |
almost 4 years ago | about 9 hours ago | |
C | TypeScript | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
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libsignal-protocol-c
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I wonder why Signal’s download size is so much larger than the competition? Intuition says it would be smaller
Signal wrote their own open source protocol, libsignal, to provide end to end encryption; or as they put it "a ratcheting forward secrecy protocol that works in synchronous and asynchronous messaging environments." Source I'd wager good money a chunk of that space is for said library and dependencies PLUS the regular rigamarole for an Android app.
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Session Encrypted Messenger
The whitepaper at [1] is more impressive than I expected it to be, not for what is built today (which on a quick read appears to be rather unexciting), but for the class of attacks recognised as unsolved, and identified as requiring future work.
Improvements identified include:
1) Encrypted messages should have a constant size (padded). Note that the Signal protocol used by Session currently uses variable length messages[2].
2) Encrypted messages should be sent as noise by clients through the onion network and back to themselves at random intervals frequent enough that messages to/from other parties are statistically indistinguishable to Eve from the noise generated.
3) Intermediate nodes in the onion network should hold and delay encrypted messages so they are adequately mixed before being sent forward. This makes it statistically difficult for Eve to match up a message entering a node and a message leaving a node. Ideally messages would be mixed across enough nodes of the onion network that
4) Proof of work should be replaced with a better technique for preventing degradation of service or spam attacks. The paper quite rightly identifies that proof of work would favour Eve who has setup a data center filled with custom ASICs solving proof of work problems, rather than favouring Alice or Bob with an energy efficient mobile phone SoC. CAPTCHAs are identified as a possible future solution to this class of attacks.
I doubt those improvements would have much application outside of labs and experiments though. Unless a significant part of the global economy surprisingly becomes dependent on a traffic analysis resistant anonymising protocol, it is too easy to just block such protocols similar to what China does with its Great Firewall.
[1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/2002.04609.pdf
[2] https://github.com/signalapp/libsignal-protocol-c/blob/maste...
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Are There Any Tutorials On How To Use The Signal
Signal protocol library for C/C++.
- Millions Flock to Telegram and Signal as Fears Grow Over Big Tech
session-desktop
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How does SonoBus compares to Signal with regards to encryption, quality and latency?
https://github.com/oxen-io/session-android https://github.com/oxen-io/session-desktop https://github.com/oxen-io/session-ios
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"message deleted" prompt still appears after months
This is the correct place to raise feature requests and bug reports: https://github.com/oxen-io/session-desktop/issues
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session wont connect. is anyone else having issues?
We're at 1.10.8. Please update: https://github.com/oxen-io/session-desktop/releases
- Multiple accounts on session?
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Signal impersonation risk?
Session's reasoning seems much more... cagey. Telling people to recreate their identities themselves sounds a little like the Threema stopgap solution, but it's much sloppier (I can't imagine end users WANT to recreate their account and communicate this to all their contacts via a third party). They're talking about implementing this eventually, but the ticket for doing so was closed right after saying this.
- Session: ISP can tell when you use the messenger, right?
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⟳ 6 apps added, 93 updated at f-droid.org
Session F-Droid (version 1.15.4): Encrypted private messenger
- PGP ile elinizde bulundurduğunuz gizli lozan anlaşmalarını (dosya veya metin, ikisi de olur) şifreleyebilirsiniz. Resimdeki dosyanın şifresinin kırılabilmesi için en az 20 yıl gerekiyor (bu da en az, 20 yıldan fazla bile olabilir) Bu programın ne işe yarayabileceğini yoruma attım. (Kaydırgaçlı post)
- Iranian here responding to the signal post: clarifying the internet situation in Iran
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Help people in Iran reconnect to Signal
Or Briar, Session, Tox, Element/Matrix, Jami...
What are some alternatives?
libsignal-protocol-javascript - This library is no longer maintained. libsignal-protocol-javascript was an implementation of the Signal Protocol, written in JavaScript. It has been replaced by libsignal-client’s typesafe TypeScript API.
Tox - The future of online communications.
session-android - A private messenger for Android.
qTox - qTox is a chat, voice, video, and file transfer IM client using the encrypted peer-to-peer Tox protocol.
wire-server - 🇪🇺 Wire back-end services
jami-cli - Jami client for terminal
libsignal-protocol-java - Signal Protocol library for Java/Android
berty - Berty is a secure peer-to-peer messaging app that works with or without internet access, cellular data or trust in the network
Signal-Desktop - A private messenger for Windows, macOS, and Linux.
Speek - Privacy focused messenger that doesn't trust anyone with your identity, your contact list, or your communications
ricochet - Anonymous peer-to-peer instant messaging
TextSecure - A private messenger for Android.