rpi-open-firmware VS systemd

> Please correct me if I'm wrong.

My memory told me it was the GPU that needed the blobs. So I asked at DDG

https://duckduckgo.com/?t=ftsa&q=binary+blobs+and+the+Raspbe...

Turned up this: https://wiki.debian.org/RaspberryPi and it says...

> All Raspberry Pi models before the 4 (1A, 1B, 1A+, 1B+, Zero, Zero W, 2, 3, Zero 2 W) boot from their GPU (not from the CPU!), so they require a non-free binary blob to boot

So the 4 (and I suppose the 5, if it ever actually comes...)

Goes on to say:

> Since then, Broadcom publicly released some code, licensed as 3-Clause BSD, to aid the making of an open source GPU driver. The "rpi-open-firmware" effort to replace the VPU firmware blob started in 2016. See more at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11703842 . Unfortunately development of rpi-open-firmware is currently (2021-06) stalled.

So there you are. Not wrong, are you, but not strictly correct, depending on "...to run properly" definition

https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware has updates 3-months ago

many of those demos work on the the entire pi model range

pi3 support is only broken due to arm side problems, which could be fixed by just using a different bootloader

and the https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware codebase can already boot linux headlessly on both pi2 and pi3, it uses a different arm bootloader

Yes, and some folks are reverse engineering their stuff:

https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware/

rpi-open-firmware: open-source VPU side bootloader for Raspberry Pi\ (35 comments)

There is work being done on the RPi4, for example the SHA1 HMAC protecting the boot on the RPi4 had to be cracked (and was easily), I hear future versions have RSA signing support, so the proprietary firmware might become mandatory at some point.

https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware/blob/master/do...

There is a project to create an open source version of the proprietary GPU firmware that boots into the ARM processor:

https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware

I note that even the Raspberry Pi is moving towards locked down devices, the RPi4 has an (easily cracked) HMAC blocking booting into the open source firmware and I hear more recent hardware editions have RSA signing support in the bootrom code.

https://github.com/librerpi/rpi-open-firmware/blob/master/do...

No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination of the project maintainer, and you have the galls to defend him? This is truly deranged stuff.

And again, there is no "vulnerability", there is simply a person that doesn't know how Linux works and has learned something new. Which again it's fine, nobody knows everything and we all learn new things everyday, it's just that normal and sensible people don't use that to make grand claims on social media and start harassment campaigns culminating in death threats.

Professional security researchers responsibly report real issues using the appropriate channels, such as defined at: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy this is not the work of a researcher, this is a grifter looking for self-promotion on social media.

> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default

5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.

7. POSIX allows it:

* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...

> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters

FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.

> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.

According to the man page source[0]:

> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`

and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.

In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.

(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...

bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...

the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237

PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...

There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them

Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?

There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550

This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.

The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550