documentation VS sealed-secrets

Both Kata Containers and UTM support virtio-fs, so this is not strictly true. The former can be used as a stand-in replacement for the runtime used by docker desktop[1]. With the latter, one could use a UTM-backed guest as a docker runtime in macOS[2] or run docker directly on the guest[3].

[1] https://github.com/kata-containers/documentation/blob/master...

[2] https://www.codeluge.com/post/setting-up-docker-on-macos-m1-...

[3] https://www.lifeintech.com/2021/11/03/docker-performance-on-...

For services with increased security requirements, it is recommended to use a low-level run-time with a high degree of isolation (gVisior, Kata-runtime)

On the official Kata repo, I found a tutorial only for manually deployed Kubernetes on GCE.

This is new and may not be used much, but it is possible to use part of Kata with part of Firecracker. https://github.com/kata-containers/documentation/wiki/Initia...

If it's using firecracker, it's probably using KVM virtualization while ensuring that the memory the VM consumes is not pinned... that is, that the VM can be swapped out of memory. For reference, firecracker was created by AWS to run and secure AWS Lambda. The hypervisor is written in rust and uses seccomp to eliminate unnecessary system calls. They open sourced it a few years back.

What you gain is a stronger security boundary. Just FYI, since 2019, you can also do this in Kubernetes using Kata containers which will happily shim firecracker. The setup is not simple though.

https://github.com/kata-containers/documentation/wiki/Initia...

Overall, fly.io building infrastructure on this pattern is fantastic and making it accessible is fantastic. Looking forward to seeing how this continues to evolve and am happy to see more infra build on top of firecracker. Very exciting!

External-Secrets Operator : A Kubernetes operator that integrates external secret management systems like AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault, Google Secrets Manager, and many more. The operator reads information from external APIs and automatically injects the values into a Kubernetes Secret (Alternatives : Vault, SOPS, Sealed Secrets)

I like sealed secrets (https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets) a lot. It's like 1Password, but for apps in kubernetes. You only need to secure a private key, and can throw encrypted secrets in a public github repo or anywhere you want.

It's owned by VMware (Broadcom) now, so you have to decide which company you hate more.

If you have noticed, you are setting secrets in plain text on the application-configmap.yml file, which is not ideal and is not a best practice for security. The best way to do this securely would be to use AWS Secrets Manager, an external service like HashiCorp Vault, or Sealed Secrets. To learn more about these methods see the blog post Shhhh... Kubernetes Secrets Are Not Really Secret!.

Yeah documentation is hard and I'm guilty (as a former maintainer of SealedSecrets)

SealedSecrets was designed with "write only" secrets in mind.

Turns out a lot of people need to access the current secrets because they need to update a part of a "composite" secret.

There are two kinds of "composite" secrets, one easy and one harder, but if you don't know how to do it, even the easier is hard:

1. Secret with multiple data "items" (also called keys in K8s Secret jargon but that's confusing when there is encryption involved). I.e. good old "data":{"foo": "....", "bar": "..."}

2. Secrets where data within one item is actually a config file with cleartext and secrets mixed up in one single string (usually some JSON or YAML or TOML)

Case 1 is "easy" to deal with once you realize that sealed secrets files are just text files and you can just manually merge and update encryoted data items. We even created a "merge" and some "raw" encryption APIs to make that process a little less "copy pasta" but it's still hard to have a good UX that works for everyone.

Case 2 is harder. We did implement a data templating feature that allows you to generate a config file via a go-template that keeps the cleartext parts in clear and uses templating directives to inject the secret parts where you want (referencing the encrypted the items)

The main problem with case 2 is that it's undocumented.

The feature landed in 2021:

https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/pull/580

I noticed that people at my current $dayjob used sealed secrets for years and it took me a while to understand that the reason they hated it was that they didn't know about that fundamental feature.

And how to blame them!? It's still undocumented!

In my defense I spent so much effort before and after I left VMware to lobby so that the project got the necessary staffing so it wouldn't die of bitrot that I didn't have much time left to work on documentation. Which is a bit said and probably just an excuse :-)

That said, I'm happy that the project is alive and the current maintainers are taking care of it against the forces of entropy. Perhaps some doc work would be useful too. Unfortunately I don't have time for now.

This might be OT, and forgive me, but I think one of the best practices for Encrypting and Managing secrets in Kubernetes is to use Sealed Secrets, they allow your secrets to be securely stored in git with the rest of the configuration and yet no one with access to the Git repository will be able to read them. I say this might be OT, because Sealed Secrets are trying to mitigate a different threat, the threat of the secrets at rest somewhere, and not "live in the cluster", where in theory all the ingredients to decrypt the secrets would still live.

The addition of Consul and Vault gives me a few things. For one, right now I'm handling secrets with a mixture of SOPS and Sealed Secrets. I use Vault in my professional life, and have used both Vault and Consul at my last job. Vault is a beast, so I may as well get better at it; plus its options for secret injection are better.

Use Sealed Secrets Operator.

sealed-secrets (sealed)