cipher-aes
ed25519
| cipher-aes | ed25519 | |
|---|---|---|
| - | 17 | |
| 22 | 22 | |
| - | - | |
| 0.0 | 4.5 | |
| almost 4 years ago | over 1 year ago | |
| C | C | |
| BSD 3-clause "New" or "Revised" License | MIT License |
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cipher-aes
We haven't tracked posts mentioning cipher-aes yet.
Tracking mentions began in Dec 2020.
ed25519
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"YOLO" is not a valid hash construction
Software engineers should be made aware of such pitfalls, but I don't think a whole course is necessary or useful. It's very easy to build encryption that you can't crack, especially because the "types of attacks" is a truly endless font.
It's probably more useful to have a module within a course to discuss the current state of the art and learning some history about how the methods were chosen (e.g. NIST's AES, SHA2/3, and PQC open processes. I think making it very obvious that there are extremely good, quality, free tools out there would reduce the likelihood of someone DIYing some crap.
That said, I once spec'd using Ed25519 asymmetric signatures for webhooks sent out to customers, and later on one of our Elixir developers was complaining that the throughput was garbage. I was confused because https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ boasts signing rates of ~27k/sec/core on very old hardware. Turns out they were using some "pure Elixir" library which had shit (over 1000x worse) performance. There wasn't any real surface area for attacks here, but there are plenty of devs who will blindly search package-manager-of-choice for an otherwise good encryption and get screwed. Not sure who blame in that scenario.
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NIST Announces Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
From https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/:
> High security level. This system has a 2^128 security target; breaking it has similar difficulty to breaking NIST P-256, RSA with ~3000-bit keys, strong 128-bit block ciphers, etc.
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Joining ChatCraft.org
The first step was to generate an ed25519 - ssh key for my Github account.
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GitLab: Authentication and Signing with SSH Keys
From the GitLab documentation, ED25519 keys are recommended, as they are more secure and performant than RSA keys, according to the book Practical Cryptography With Go.
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The Algorand Community Study Group just had our first meeting yesterday. We read Chapter 15 Elliptic Curve Cryptography in A Graduate Course in Applied Cryptography (Boneh, Shoup). Are you interested in learning applied cryptography? Which topic should we cover next? Come join us!
Correction regarding Ed25519: The Edwards Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/ was developed by a team including Daniel J. Bernstein, Niels Duif, Tanja Lange, Peter Schwabe, and Bo-Yin Yang. The first paper came out in 2011.
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[Sysadmin] Quel est le niveau de sécurité de la clé ed25519 par rapport à la clé ecdsa ou rsa pour les clés ssh ?
Les concepteurs de l'algorithme estimation :
- Have you been hacked? Tell your story
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How SHA-256 Works Step-By-Step
Ed25519
- Обзор Aptos SDK
- Руководство по Созданию подписанной транзакции
What are some alternatives?
PBKDF2 - WARNING: This package is broken. Do not use it.
cryptohash-md5 - Fast, pure and practical MD5 implementation
entropy - Easy entropy source for Haskell users.
crypto-numbers - DEPRECATED - use cryptonite - Cryptographic number related function and algorithms
blake3 - official implementations of the BLAKE3 cryptographic hash function
secp256k1 - Haskell bindings for secp256k1 library