heads
tpm2-totp
heads | tpm2-totp | |
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31 | 5 | |
1,380 | 148 | |
0.9% | 6.8% | |
9.5 | 0.0 | |
6 days ago | about 1 month ago | |
Makefile | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | BSD 3-clause "New" or "Revised" License |
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heads
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Thinkpad W530 No GPU output
I downloaded the VGA ROM for my Thinkpad W530 for both the Intel IGPU and Nvidia Quadro K1000M using this and configured the build config to use them with the correct PCI ports (8086,0166 10de,0ffc). Everything works fine except the output for both the VGA and the mini DP port. Does anyone have any ideas of what I could be missing here?
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Can i make full disk encryption more convenient or should i just use an encrypted home dir?
You may be interested in Heads, which is available on Purism laptops under the name PureBoot. Though this really needs a coreboot-capable machine, I think, and isn't something you can just add to your existing UEFI boot chain.
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Getting LUKS, Btrfs, Hibernation and Swap file working in tandem
You don't need to encrypt anything to verify those images, you just need to sign them. See how Heads does this.
https://github.com/osresearch/heads
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Live OS needs a new name, what should it be?
Unfortunately there is also the Heads secure firmware: https://osresearch.net/ as well. Otherwise my vote would go to Heads. Liive OS could be pretty hard to optimize in a search engine, they'll think it's misspelled. Could call it "Miles" and just never ack the reference...
- Heads: Minimal Linux that runs as coreboot payload to provide secure environment
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Grub, Syslinux, or another bootloader?
Heads, https://osresearch.net/
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verify secure flash
If you worried about malicious changes, there is the write lock protection feature in coreboot that prevents internal flashing. This would require you to flash externally whenever you want to update coreboot. If worried someone will also flash your BIOS externally, you may want to look into Heads
- Dedicated mini PC for Bitcoin transactions with no wifi? Most Raspberry Pi models have wifi and the zero 1.3 seems to have been discontinued
- Physical Key Computer Access
- Is TPM actually anti-consumer?
tpm2-totp
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TOTP tokens on my wrist with the smartest dumb watch
You need a TPM 2.0 compatible CPU, but something like this sounds really excellent: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
This means your laptop itself would be your hardware device, the TOTP secret would be stored in the TPM and theoretically impossible to steal/copy. Of course this means you will probably want a mobile device (possibly a second laptop also) as a backup.)
- Can you detect tampering in /boot without SecureBoot on Linux?
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Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux
>But okay, you may extend my attack by saying that you exchange the motherboard between the victim and the attacker laptop, so that you don't need to replicate the chassis.
Modern computers has tamper detection and if you open them you'll need to type the BIOS password.
However, replacing the motherboard is going to replace the TPM. This is easily detectable with something like tpm2_totp in the bootchain.
https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
- Attest computer secure boot state to phone via time-based OTP and TPM
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Does the TPM boost secure boot security?
You could also use TOTP for a kind of remote attestation (e.g., with your phone computing TOTP). In this setup, the CPU sends the timestamp to the TPM, and it returns the TOTP value. So instead of you looking at your phone to give the TOTP to a service provider to prove that you're in possession of your phone, the computer gives you a TOTP value to prove that it's in possession (inside the TPM, sealed to the boot chain hashes) of the TOTP secret, and you use your phone to verify this. A possible weakness (short of a full-blown TPM compromise) would be to send a bunch of forged timestamps to the TPM while your computer is running and store the resulting TOTP values, then tamper with Secure Boot and emit the precomputed TOTP corresponding to the current timestamp whenever you boot up your computer. But this would require running malicious code on your compute while you're logged in with the trusted boot chain.
What are some alternatives?
skulls - pre-built coreboot images and documentation on how to flash them for Thinkpad Laptops
sbctl - :computer: :lock: :key: Secure Boot key manager
1vyrain - LiveUSB Bootable exploit chain to unlock all features of xx30 ThinkPad machines. WiFi Whitelist, Advanced Menu, Overclocking.
mortar - Framework to join Linux's physical security bricks.
NanoPi-R4S-OpenWRT - OpenWrt Frimwares for FriendlyARM NanoPi R4S
btrfs-todo - An issues only repo to organize our TODO items
safeboot - Scripts to slightly improve the security of the Linux boot process with UEFI Secure Boot and TPM support
cryptboot - Encrypted boot partition manager with UEFI Secure Boot support
EMBA - EMBA - The firmware security analyzer
decrypt-otpauth-files - Decrypt files created by OTP Auth
BangleApps - Bangle.js App Loader (and Apps)