gatekeeper VS runc

When the Gatekeeper validatingwebhook came up, I was really worried that'd be the issue! Regardless I'd recommend anyone who cares about their cluster not collapsing to change the gatekeeper webhook to only intercept resources you care about: https://github.com/open-policy-agent/gatekeeper/pull/1806

Kyverno adds an extra layer of security where only the allowed type of manifest is deployed onto kubernetes, otherwise, it will reject or we can set validationFailureAction to audit which only logs the policy violation message for reporting. Kubewarden and Gatekeeper are alternative tools available to enforce policies on Kubernetes CRD.

Now, we have the hardest part resolved and let's turn our attention to the OPA Gatekeeper. Gatekeeper uses the OPA Constraint Framework to describe and enforce policy. Right now there are mainly 3 parts we should pay attention:

They enable you to establish the policies and regulations that govern cluster deployments and applications. Using predefined policies, policy engines can dynamically modify or create configurations. Policy engines such as Gatekeeper and Kyverno can be leveraged to meet legal and compliance requirements while maintaining operational flexibility and development speed.

Setup policy around what resource requirements can be requested by an app per environment. OPA and gatekeeper or kyverno can help. Setup access control for who can create or modify apps.

OPA Gatekeeper is an open source, general purpose policy engine. OPA decouples policy decisions from other responsibilities of an application, like those commonly referred to as business logic. OPA works equally well making decisions for Kubernetes, Microservices, functional application authorization and more, thanks to its single unified policy language.

I can speak to this. Containers, and by extension k8s, break a well known security boundary that has existed for a very long time - whether you are using a real (hardware) server or a virtual machine on the cloud if you pop that instance/server generally speaking you only have access to that server. Yeh, you might find a db config with connection details if you landed on say a web app host but in general you still have to work to start popping the next N servers.

That's not the case when you are running in k8s and the last container breakout was just announced ~1 month ago: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/G... .

At the end of the day it is simply not a security boundary. It can solve other problems but not security ones.

It's interesting that, in light of things like this, you still see large software companies adding support for new components written in non-memory safe languages (e.g. C)

As an example Red Hat OpenShift added support for crun(https://github.com/containers/crun) this year(https://cloud.redhat.com/blog/whats-new-in-red-hat-openshift...), which is written in C as an alternative to runc, which is written in Go(https://github.com/opencontainers/runc)...

Rabbit hole indeed. That wasn't related to my job at the time, lol. The job change came with a company-provided computer and that put an end to the tinkering.

BTW, I found my hacks to make runc run on Chromebook: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/main...gabrys...

being the main author of crun, I can clarify that statement: I am not a fan of Go _for this particular use case_.

Using C instead of Go avoided a bunch of the workarounds that exists in runc to workaround the Go runtime, e.g. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontaine...

runc

Not OP, but if I had to guess, a lot of this can be picked up by just observing common security issues in the Linux space, since similar mistakes and oversights have caused quite a few real-world CVEs in the past, e.g. this random example of a TOCTTOU vulnerability in runc.