fulcio | Rustup | |
---|---|---|
6 | 58 | |
600 | 5,892 | |
0.7% | 1.0% | |
9.6 | 9.6 | |
6 days ago | 3 days ago | |
Go | Rust | |
Apache License 2.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
fulcio
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NPM Provenance Public Beta
untrue.
The Root CA is generated by the sigstore community (five folks, two from academia) this is what is used for the trust root for the signing. Right now github exchanges a OIDC token for a sigstore root chained cert.
GitLab are currently adding themselves, to have the same capability.
https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio/pull/1097
- [pre-RFC] Using Sigstore for signing and verifying crates
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Implementing code signing and verification
They also say thay they integrate with Fulcio which seems to be a self-managing CA. Never tried it, though.
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Freezing Requirements with Pip-Tools
https://docs.sigstore.dev/ :
> sigstore empowers software developers to securely sign software artifacts such as release files, container images, binaries, bill of material manifests and more. Signing materials are then stored in a tamper-resistant public log.
> It’s free to use for all developers and software providers, with sigstore’s code and operational tooling being 100% open source, and everything maintained and developed by the sigstore community.
> How sigstore works: Using Fulcio, sigstore requests a certificate from our root Certificate Authority (CA). This checks you are who you say you are using OpenID Connect, which looks at your email address to prove you’re the author. Fulcio grants a time-stamped certificate, a way to say you’re signed in and that it’s you.
https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio
> You don’t have to do anything with keys yourself, and sigstore never obtains your private key. The public key that Cosign creates gets bound to your certificate, and the signing details get stored in sigstore’s trust root, the deeper layer of keys and trustees and what we use to check authenticity.
https://github.com/sigstore/cosign
> our certificate then comes back to sigstore, where sigstore exchanges keys, asserts your identity and signs everything off. The signature contains the hash itself, public key, signature content and the time stamp. This all gets uploaded to a Rekor transparency log, so anyone can check that what you’ve put out there went through all the checks needed to be authentic.
https://github.com/sigstore/rekor
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Sigstore: A Solution to Software Supply Chain Security
fulcio is a root CA for code signing certs. Its job is to issue code-signing certificates and to embed OIDC identity into code-signing certificate. From this description we can see that it performs these tasks in steps 2, 3, 4 and 8.
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Sigstore – A new standard for signing, verifying and protecting software
Did you follow the link to the project list on Github? The actual tool for doing the signing, cosign, is just a binary you can install on your device and generate signatures and keys yourself. The "service" part of it seems to just be having your public certificate vouched for by a trusted code signing CA. I don't see anything in the tooling that requires your users to only trust that CA. If you want to sign your cert with your own CA and tell your users to trust that instead, they seemingly can do that, just as you can do that today in browsers. That you can't do it with Firefox extensions and mobile app stores is a limitation intentionally built into the distribution channel. It's not a limitation of PKI itself. iOS, Android, and Mozilla could have chosen to let users install arbitrary trusted CAs. You shouldn't dismiss all PKI based on the fact that a few vendors have chosen to implement it in a crappy way to make walled gardens.
It doesn't say this on the announcement, but looking at the actual PKI service (https://github.com/sigstore/fulcio), it seems to be entirely possible to self-host the service and roll your own CA.
Rustup
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Problem with rust-analyzer in helix
I got it to finally work by following this
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Do you use relative toolchain paths with rustup? Let us know!
If you are someone actively using such relative-path toolchains, please contact us (Discord / Github issues).
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Canonical hiring Rust toolchain dev
We had a snap package; we removed it in mid 2022
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Announcing Rustup 1.26.0 | Rust Blog
I don't know. The PR references prior discussion without a link, so it may have been private.
- Foundation - Open Membership
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Telemetry really goes into Go toolchain, no matter what
As long as he doesn't put hidden folders in your root like rust. https://github.com/rust-lang/rustup/issues/341
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telemetry in the go toolchain? just say no...
I think you're being upvoted by folks who don't know better, which is a shame because you're making things up :/. The telemetry feature in rustup kept everything local and never "pinged home". And you had to enable it with a command `rustup telemetry enable`. And it just logged JSON files at the path you mentioned. By 2019, the feature was disabled (see: https://github.com/rust-lang/rustup/issues/341 ) because no one worked on it and it just gathered bugs.
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Go claims telemetry objectors arguing in bad faith and violating Code of Conduct
FWIW, there is a proposal to add telemetry to LLVM [0] and Rust used to have telemetry [1], both off by default. Some things in the node.js world have telemetry enabled by default, like Next.js [3].
Some people are posting here as if this as already decided -- AFIACT, that's not the case. It's not even a formal proposal yet, and the stated intent was to start a conversation around something concrete. (For context, this is standard for how I've seen the Go project approaches large topics, including for example I think there were something like ~8 very detailed generics design drafts from the core Go team over ~10 years).
It sounds like the Go team is going to take some time to look into some of the alternative approaches suggested in the feedback collected so far.
In any event, this is obviously a topic people are very passionate about, especially opt-in vs. opt-out, but I guess I would suggest not giving up hope quite yet.
[0] https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-lldb-telemetry-metrics/6458...
[1] https://github.com/rust-lang/rustup/issues/341
[2] https://nextjs.org/telemetry
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Google's Go may add telemetry reporting that's on by default
Rust (Specifically Rust Up) seems to have planned to include telemetry but they paused and cancelled the decision, possibly after implementing it initially.
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Who "owns" Rust ?
https://github.com/rust-lang/rustup/issues/341 and rust installation uses telemetry
What are some alternatives?
rekor - Software Supply Chain Transparency Log
rust - Empowering everyone to build reliable and efficient software.
cosign - Code signing and transparency for containers and binaries
rust-mode - Emacs configuration for Rust
root-signing
rust-on-raspberry-pi
pyflow - An installation and dependency system for Python
Rust for Visual Studio Code
cargo-crev - A cryptographically verifiable code review system for the cargo (Rust) package manager.
Rust Language Server - Repository for the Rust Language Server (aka RLS)
dsse - A specification for signing methods and formats used by Secure Systems Lab projects.
cargo-modules - Visualize/analyze a Rust crate's internal structure