fiedka VS SupplyChainAttacks

Maybe someone could add key manifest inspection to this OSS tool, https://fiedka.app.

Hopefully Intel and OEMs will make official statements soon.

If you're copying a firmware file from the OEM's website to Binarly's website, then receiving a text report, they would have an IP address, browser fingerprint and device model number, but little else.

Since the log is purely binary, one has to extract the data first according to this manual.

Why should anyone trust a remove server providing a signed statement of authenticity when Intel[1], MSI[2], Lenovo[3], NVIDIA[4], Microsoft and others keep losing their keys? Even if they haven't lost their keys recently, technology companies don't have a great track record of producing foolproof hardware designs (e.g. recent case of [5]), if foolproof was ever a reasonable expectation. For starters, it's assuming technology such as ptychographic X-ray computed tomography and focused ion beam machining won't become more commonplace and commercially viable to readily break TPM attestation schemes. Or that with wider use of TPM attestation, more effort will be expended into breaking it whereas for the current state with minimal adoption, few people care.

The issue client-side is that if a single vendor or TPM design is compromised, your threat actors have more motive, resources and ability to exploit this compromised hardware than you do. And critically, you as a user are blocked by your own choice of TPM attestation technology from discovering attacks and auditing your own system security, as you ceded control of your own systems. Instead, your systems are controlled by a few technology companies that have a proven terrible track record of fulfilling their alleged intent of keeping your systems and data secure. Why should they care if it doesn't lead to a higher profit at the end of the year.

[1] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M...

[2] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M...

[3] https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/L...

[4] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30565985

[5] https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.14717

Money Message has this week claimed that MSI has refused to meet their demands - as a result, an upload of stolen data started on Thursday with files appearing on the group's own website, and spreading to the dark web soon after. Binarly, a cybersecurity firm, has since analyzed the leaked files and discovered the presence of many private code signing keys within the breached data dump. Alex Matrosov, Binarly's CEO states via Twitter: "Recently, MSI USA announced a significant data breach. The data has now been made public, revealing a vast number of private keys that could affect numerous devices. FW Image Signing Keys: 57 products (and) Intel Boot Guard BPM/KM Keys: 166 products." Binary has provided a list of affected MSI devices (gaming laptops & mobile workstations) on their GitHub page.

lol, yes. but not their mobos... mainly laptops: https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/MSI/MsiImpactedDevices.md

Binarly also posted another set of keys that were apparently leaked in the MSI breach. These aren't Boot Guard keys, but are instead orange unlock keys for Gemini Lake and Apollo Lake systems. Intel CPUs expose various sets of debug capabilities to debug production systems; there are several levels of debug access that are supported, with higher levels requiring authentication. Red unlock is the most powerful state - it lets you access much more than just architectural x86 state, including microarchitectural state [such as the decrypted microcode sequencer ROM]; it also can be used to execute undocumented instructions. It even lets you debug the Intel ME x86 core!

Link: Binarly GitHub

Or the GitHub link below

https://github.com/binarly-io/SupplyChainAttacks/blob/main/M...