cryptsetup VS session-android

Overall, “dm-crypt” is a device-mapper target (https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.5-rc3/source/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c#L3689) supported from kernel version 2.6.4 (https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v2.6.4/source/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c). It is responsible for transparent (aka real-time/on-the-fly encryption) block device encryption while using the kernel crypto API (https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/-/wikis/DMCrypt) .

For more information check section 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"? of LUKS FAQ.

Please read the section 5.21 Why is there no "Nuke-Option"? of the LUKS FAQ for more information (eg. when a "wipe" option could actually harm you).

Check out the section 5.2 and 5.18 of the LUKS FAQ for more information.

See section 5.2 of LUKS FAQ and Key disclosure law all over the world.

References: - Frequently Asked Questions Cryptsetup/LUKS - Question 2.15: "neither dm-crypt nor LUKS1 stores partition size and LUKS2 uses a generic "whole device" size as default." - Stackexchange: What does cryptsetup resize do if LUKS doesn't store partition size?

LUKS is probably what you want

Other alternatives include Session (free) and Threema (paid - 5€).

Test it by downloading session at getsession.org and DM the bot by starting a new message and sending it to “Simple” (without quotes)

Figured there should be moves to set one up if not - https://getsession.org/

* marketing "Perfect Forward Secrecy" AKA "Forward Secrecy"[0].

I favor Session Private Messenger[1] because it is decentralized and allows third party clients, but Signal enthusiasts warn me that the Session client may, hypothetically, at some future date, integrate a cryptocurrency, as the Signal client already does[2].

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy

[1] https://getsession.org

[2] https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/signal.html

If you have a mobile phone number, the domestic intelligence agency knows exactly where you are at all times and any LEO (without a warrant) can also find you. In addition, there have been numerous CCC presentations showing how insecure the global (excluding US) and (separately) US carriers are guilty of promiscuous metadata trafficking ($$) and insecure SS7 setups. As a consequence, for low $, you can go to any one of several shady websites and find the last location of almost any phone number (person unique ID) globally. There are additional varying exploitable vulnerabilities depending on the exact combination of {handset x carrier x country} to impersonate them, tap their line, reveal their exact location, and redirect their phone number through a third-party handset or even a PBX. These are more expensive and some capabilities are forbidden for all but a few selective intelligence uses.

Session (Signal fork) doesn't use phone numbers. It's pretty well-designed overall and uses an onion routing approach. It's already a superset of Signal except it doesn't use phone numbers. https://getsession.org

Also look interesting:

* (unproven) https://www.olvid.io/technology

* (unproven) https://simplex.chat

PS: Using regular TOR on home broadband or cloud servers is relatively risky and inefficient. Sybil attacks on it are common. And to network operators and security agencies it gives an easy "flow tag" of your uplink and exit node data traffic as automatically suspicious.