crev
gecko-dev
crev | gecko-dev | |
---|---|---|
12 | 78 | |
387 | 3,122 | |
1.8% | 1.0% | |
1.8 | 10.0 | |
over 2 years ago | about 3 hours ago | |
- | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
crev
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Hard disk LEDs and noisy machines
In other cases it may be more documented, such as Golangs baked-in telemetry.
There should be better ways to check these problems. The best I have found so far is Crev https://github.com/crev-dev/crev/. It's most used implementation is Cargo-crev https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev, but hopefully it will become more required to use these types of tools. Certainty and metrics about how many eyes have been on a particular script, and what expertise they have would be a huge win for software.
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50% new NPM packages are spam
Looks like there's an implementation of it for npm: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
I've been willing to try it for a while for Rust projects but never committed to spend the time. Any feedback?
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NPM repository flooded with 15,000 phishing packages
If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.
It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.
That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
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Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
I don't think it makes much sense to verify pypi authors. I mean you could verify corporations and universities and that would get you far, but most of the packages you use are maintained by random people who signed up with a random email address.
I think it makes more sense to verify individual releases. There are tools in that space like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] that facilitate this, allowing you to trust your colleagues or specific people rather than the package authors. This seems like a much more viable solution to scale trust.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
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The Python Package Index (PyPI) warns of an ongoing phishing campaign to steal developer credentials and distribute malicious updates.
Crev?
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Vetting the Cargo
Alternatives to cargo-vet that has been mentioned before here on HN:
- https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
- https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch
Anyone know of any more alternatives or similar tools already available?
- Crev – Socially scalable Code REView and recommendation system
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Compromising Angular via expired NPM publisher email domains
I plug this every time, but here goes: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev solves this by providing code reviews, scales via a web-of-trust model, and relies on cryptographic identities. That way, you can depend on a package without having to trust its maintainers and all future versions.
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Attempt at building a multi-platform UI project (with cross-compiling)
I understand your worries about the number of dependencies you're "forced" to use, however, most of them tend to be doing something that's both non-trivial and useful for more than a single project. As for being able to trust all your transitive dependencies, well, that's something that the Crev project is trying to address, although I don't believe that has gained much traction yet.
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CII' FOSS best practices criteria
It's good that having a reproducible build process is a requirement for the Gold rating, as is signed releases.
Perhaps there needs to be a Platinum level which involves storing the hash of each release in a distributed append-only log, with multiple third parties vouching that they can build the binary from the published source.
Obviously I'm thinking of something like sigstore[0] which the Arch Linux package ecosystem is being experimentally integrated with.[1] Then there's Crev for distributed code review.[2]
[0] https://docs.sigstore.dev/
[1] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[2] https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
gecko-dev
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Making Web Component properties behave closer to the platform
You can see how Mozilla tests the compliance of their built-in elements in the Gecko repository (the ok and is assertions are defined in their SimpleTest testing framework). And here's the Web Platform Tests' reflection harness, with data for each built-in element in sibling files, that almost every browser pass.
- Widevine Content Decryption Module provided by Google Inc -- Never installs on any fresh Linux distro (see comments)
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Firefox tooltip bug fixed after 22 years
The source is mirrored on GitHub here: https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev
Code search is here: https://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/
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Firefox 113.0, New Features, Updates and Fixes
Yes. https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/tree/32c74afbb24dce4b5d...
- -moz-box and -moz-inline-box removed at v113
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Pinch Zoom with Mouse Wheel is too Slow = How to Adjust Zoom Increments?
aWheelInput.mDeltaY looks like the increment setting used for this https://github.com/mozilla/gecko-dev/commit/9033e3e1200acfd4b8f8ae024c215b99d12b97bdTried "mousewheel.default.delta_multiplier_y" and "mousewheel.with_control.delta_multiplier_y" without much luck.It may have something to do with https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1138704 although this case is about pinch zoom emulation.
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Why does firefox (at least waterfox) not support H.265?
You could add the feature by writing code to support is - https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/setup/index.html
- A Quarter Century of Mozilla
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Why is building a UI in Rust so hard?
I checked Firefox monorepo, it has over 4x more C++ than Rust.
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Fetched and build the code of the "release" but it's produced Nightly version
Are you leaving steps out or is your OP exhaustive? If you just straight up cloned release and that's it, start all over and follow https://firefox-source-docs.mozilla.org/setup/index.html for your OS
What are some alternatives?
pacman-bintrans - Experimental binary transparency for pacman with sigstore and rekor
chromium - The official GitHub mirror of the Chromium source
auto-crev-proofs
WebKit - Home of the WebKit project, the browser engine used by Safari, Mail, App Store and many other applications on macOS, iOS and Linux.
awesome-security-GRC - Curated list of resources for security Governance, Risk Management, Compliance and Audit professionals and enthusiasts (if they exist).
Skia - Skia is a complete 2D graphic library for drawing Text, Geometries, and Images.
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
brave-core - Core engine for the Brave browser for mobile and desktop. For issues https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues
cargo-vet - supply-chain security for Rust
nyxt - Nyxt - the hacker's browser.
W4SP-Stealer - w4sp Stealer official source code, one of the best python stealer on the web [GET https://api.github.com/repos/loTus04/W4SP-Stealer: 403 - Repository access blocked]
datastation - App to easily query, script, and visualize data from every database, file, and API.