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boringssl | rustls | |
---|---|---|
10 | 57 | |
1,719 | 5,437 | |
3.4% | 3.6% | |
6.5 | 9.9 | |
4 days ago | 6 days ago | |
C | Rust | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
boringssl
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New vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-3602 and CVE-2022-3786) in OpenSSL, how they affect IoT and RTOS Devices.
I have nothing constructive to add except that OpenSSL has a long history of producing vulnerabilities so much so that Google has created their own fork publicly available here: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/ (used in chromium, chrome, and android).
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OpenSSL added new C parser code [...] without doing any basic security testing
> Large web companies like Google implement their own encryption stack anyway.
Google uses BoringSSL[1], which is another OpenSSL fork. I believe AWS uses a mix of OpenSSL and Boring SSL (someone can correct me!).
So it's "their own encryption stack," but that stack is at least originally comprised of OpenSSL's code. They've probably done an admirable job of refactoring it, but API and ABI constraints still apply (it's very hard to change the massive body of existing code that assumes OpenSSL's APIs).
[1]: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/
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CVE-2022-3786 and CVE-2022-3602: X.509 Email Address Buffer Overflows
OpenSSL gets plenty of funding but we need to put more funding into TLS implementations that have a bigger focus on security and stability like boringssl, nss, go's tls, and rustls. It's 2022 and we have both languages better suited for this and tools to make existing languages safer and more robust, it's incredible to me that we aren't even more anxious over the current state of openssl.
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BearSSL: A smaller SSL/TLS library
It was not built for chromium AFAIK
To quote: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
- OpenSSL Security Advisory for CVE-2022-0778
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I think a major issue with the rust ecosystem is that it's full of unexpected design decisions
Use Google's fork of OpenSSL which exists because Google likes to do it's own weird things sometimes. This doesn't say anything about "OpenSSL is considered dangerous", it says "This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you."
- Information and learning resources for cryptography newcomers
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OpenSSL Security Advisory (14 December 2021)
And this is why projects like https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/ exist
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U.S. Telecoms Are Going to Start Physically Removing Huawei Gear
The immediate effect of Heartbleed was the OpenBSD folk [1] and Google [2] forking OpenSSL.
There's a talk from Bob Beck of OpenBSD on pruning OpenSSL, it's pretty hilarious [3].
In that case open source was at least able to react appropriately, even if it didn't act preemptively.
[1]: https://www.libressl.org
[2]: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/
[3]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnBbhXBDmwU
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Cloudflare: Warp for Linux and Proxy Mode
I doubt the reference to Musk's brand is intentional. It's more likely that it's a reference/homage to BoringSSL (https://github.com/google/boringssl) and "boring tech" in general that is purposefully designed to be minimalist, simple to use, and narrow in scope.
rustls
- Pingora: HTTP Server and Proxy Library, in Rust, by Cloudflare, Released
- Alternative to openssl for reqwest https with client certs.
- rustls 0.22 is out with pluggable crypto providers and better CRL support
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Exploring the Rust compiler benchmark suite
The RustTLS project is currently setting up their own CI benchmarking workflow, so I think that you could find some inspiration there: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/issues/1385 and https://github.com/rustls/rustls/issues/1205.
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What are the scenarios where "Rewrite it in Rust" didn't meet your expectations or couldn't be successfully implemented?
I also studied this question on FFI several weeks ago in terms of "rewrite part of the system in Rust". Unexpected results could be semantic issues (e.g., different error handling methods) or security issues (FFI could be a soundness hole). I suggest going through the issues of libraries that have started rewriting work such as rust-openssl or rustls (This is the one trying to rewrite in whole rust rather than using FFI; however, you will not be able to find the mapping function in the C version and compare them). I hope this helps!
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A brief guide to choosing TLS crates
Now for rust implementation of tls. Certificates can be loaded in two ways. * Finds and loads certificates using OS specific tools3 * Uses a rust implementation of webpki4 for loading with certificates5
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Microsoft is busy rewriting core Windows library code in memory-safe Rust
> Ring is mostly C/Assembly
Crypto needs to be written in Assembly to ensure that operations take a constant time, regardless of input. Writing it in a high level language like C or Rust opens you up to the compiler "optimising" routines and making them no longer constant time.
But you already knew this. And you also knew that the security audit (https://github.com/rustls/rustls/blob/master/audit/TLS-01-re...) of ring was favourable
> No issues were found with regards to the cryptographic engineering of rustls or its underlying ring library. A recommendation is provided in TLS-01-001 to optionally supplement the already solid cryptographic library with another cryptographic provider (EverCrypt) with an added benefit of formally verified cryptographic primitives. Overall, it is very clear that the developers of rustls have an extensive knowledge on how to correctly implement the TLS stack whilst avoiding the common pitfalls that surround the TLS ecosystem. This knowledge has translated reliably into an implementation of exceptional quality.
You said
> a standard library with feature flags and editions would make rust ridiculously much more productive
What's the difference between opting into a library with a feature flag and opting in with a line in Cargo.toml? Let's say you want to use the de-facto regex library. Would it really be ridiculously productive if you said you wanted the "regex" feature flag instead of the "regex" crate?
I do agree that the standard library does need a versioning story so they can remove long deprecated functions. Where it gets complicated is if a new method is reintroduced using the same name in a later edition.
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gRPC with mutual TLS on IPs only
I used the commands listed in the .sh file here: https://github.com/rustls/rustls/tree/main/test-ca to generate keys/certs for a server and a client (with IP.1 records for SANs). I have added the local root CA to the trust store of each VM.
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rustls 0.21 released with support for IP address server names
This is great news, this was our single biggest annoyance with rustls. One of our cloud providers choses to issue their hosted postgres instances with TLS certificates with IP addresses. Unusual, but valid per the spec, so why not. Apparently a practise that's also popular in kubernetes settings, so I'm somewhat surprised it took 5 years to close the issue, but now I can finally recommend people to use rustls without mentioning any gotchas.
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Is Rust really safe? How to identify functions that can potentially cause panic
I believe it is more relevant than you think: servers running in containers, web assembler tasks running in browsers, embedded devices and kernels with total control of the system, all have the ability to do something more sensible than plain out SIGABRT or similar, and in many the case is not that the complete system is falling down. For example RustTLS is looking into allowing fallible allocators and as a pretty general-purpose library that seems like a nice feature. I do wish ulimit -v worked in a sensible manner with applications.
What are some alternatives?
OpenSSL - TLS/SSL and crypto library
rust-native-tls
wolfssl - The wolfSSL library is a small, fast, portable implementation of TLS/SSL for embedded devices to the cloud. wolfSSL supports up to TLS 1.3!
rust-openssl - OpenSSL bindings for Rust
libsodium - A modern, portable, easy to use crypto library.
mkcert - A simple zero-config tool to make locally trusted development certificates with any names you'd like.
Tink - Tink is a multi-language, cross-platform, open source library that provides cryptographic APIs that are secure, easy to use correctly, and hard(er) to misuse.
ring - Safe, fast, small crypto using Rust
webpki - WebPKI X.509 Certificate Validation in Rust
istlsfastyet.com - Is TLS fast yet? Yes, yes it is.
rust-crypto - A (mostly) pure-Rust implementation of various cryptographic algorithms.