appleprivacyletter
AppleNeuralHash2ONNX
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- | Apache License 2.0 |
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appleprivacyletter
- I ported Xfce4 to iOS, say aloha from neofetch
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We’re members of the Global Encryption Coalition and we are fighting attempts from governments to undermine or ban the use of strong encryption – AMA
Hi, the Global Encryption Coalition doesn't take stands as a Coalition but members often do... and 90 or so groups and experts wrote a letter earlier this year in opposition to that: https://appleprivacyletter.com/ (note that ISOC, where I work, did not join that letter)
- Delays Aren't Good Enough—Apple Must Abandon Its Surveillance Plans
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Apple Delaying Rollout of Controversial Child Safety Features
Part of me wonders if the calculus includes either (a) the open letter signed by (effectively) ~10k verified developers [1], (b) the complaint letters from groups like the EFF [2, 3], or (c) expert and qualified input from their (presumably huge) marketing department...
[1] https://appleprivacyletter.com/
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A little positivity from the new user
An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content Scanning Technology
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Policy groups ask Apple to drop plans to inspect messages, scan for abuse images
(e.g. https://appleprivacyletter.com/)
In that light, FISA is relevant. My statement was to show that not all dealings of the US government are public, because not all courts and legal proceedings are available to the public. So "serious risk of leaks to journalists" won't likely happen in that case.
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Tell Apple: Don’t Scan Our Phones
Thanks for this link. He mentions Apple Privacy Letter which is another petition for the same issue.
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My thoughts on CSAM and why I’m scared of it
You can sign the petition against Apple here.
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Bruce Schneier Crypto-Gram: “This is a security disaster”
I suggest you read the open letter circulating to better understand the problems with Apple’s implementation.
- Interview: Apple’s Head of Privacy details child abuse detection and Messages safety features
AppleNeuralHash2ONNX
- Legit app in Google Play turns malicious and sends mic recordings every 15 minutes
- Daily General Discussion - October 27, 2022
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How did apple train its cp filtering algorithm?
Perhaps you're referring to the hash collisions that were generated for the client-side NeuralHash which was reverse engineered about a year ago: https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1
- [Request] A way to remove Apple’s new NeuralHash ( iCloud CSAM scanner )
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Google AI flags parents' accounts for potential abuse over kid's photos
Except Apple’s hashes have collisions where images that are similar in content but not identical will have the same hash. Meaning their process will have the same result: benign images being flagged as CSAM. See an example here https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1
- Apple Remains Silent About Plans to Detect Known CSAM Stored in iCloud Photos
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Apple should scan iPhones for child abuse images, says scanning technology inventor
perceptual hashes are completely broken due to false positives, like making a picture of a dog having the same hash as CSAM images. They are vulnerable to collision and have no preimage resistance, the most important feature. Because of that you can DOS conversations and people by sending dog images with the same hash as a CSAM: https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1
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UK cybersecurity chiefs back plan to scan phones for child abuse images | GCHQ | The Guardian
Specifically the fact that you can have one hash on two images, for example. There are other ways to abuse the CSAM system, which is confirmed by several researchers (one, two). And Apple saying it's not a concern... only to pull back on these plans.
- Frage zur drohenden Chatkontrolle
- Apple’s CSAM troubles may be back, as EU plans a law requiring detection
What are some alternatives?
ExpansionCards - Reference designs and documentation to create Expansion Cards for the Framework Laptop
GmsCore - Free implementation of Play Services
distribution-spec - OCI Distribution Specification
hardened_malloc - Hardened allocator designed for modern systems. It has integration into Android's Bionic libc and can be used externally with musl and glibc as a dynamic library for use on other Linux-based platforms. It will gain more portability / integration over time.
onnxruntime - ONNX Runtime: cross-platform, high performance ML inferencing and training accelerator
proton-ge-custom - Compatibility tool for Steam Play based on Wine and additional components
OpenWifiPass - An open source implementation of Apple's Wi-Fi Password Sharing protocol in Python.
hn-search - Hacker News Search
mailvelope_client - Roundcube plugin to use Mailvelope's OpenPGP-support
neuralhash-collisions - A catalog of naturally occurring images whose Apple NeuralHash is identical.