appleprivacyletter VS AppleNeuralHash2ONNX

Hi, the Global Encryption Coalition doesn't take stands as a Coalition but members often do... and 90 or so groups and experts wrote a letter earlier this year in opposition to that: https://appleprivacyletter.com/ (note that ISOC, where I work, did not join that letter)

Part of me wonders if the calculus includes either (a) the open letter signed by (effectively) ~10k verified developers [1], (b) the complaint letters from groups like the EFF [2, 3], or (c) expert and qualified input from their (presumably huge) marketing department...

[1] https://appleprivacyletter.com/

An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content Scanning Technology

(e.g. https://appleprivacyletter.com/)

In that light, FISA is relevant. My statement was to show that not all dealings of the US government are public, because not all courts and legal proceedings are available to the public. So "serious risk of leaks to journalists" won't likely happen in that case.

Thanks for this link. He mentions Apple Privacy Letter which is another petition for the same issue.

You can sign the petition against Apple here.

I suggest you read the open letter circulating to better understand the problems with Apple’s implementation.

Perhaps you're referring to the hash collisions that were generated for the client-side NeuralHash which was reverse engineered about a year ago: https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1

Except Apple’s hashes have collisions where images that are similar in content but not identical will have the same hash. Meaning their process will have the same result: benign images being flagged as CSAM. See an example here https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1

perceptual hashes are completely broken due to false positives, like making a picture of a dog having the same hash as CSAM images. They are vulnerable to collision and have no preimage resistance, the most important feature. Because of that you can DOS conversations and people by sending dog images with the same hash as a CSAM: https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issues/1

Specifically the fact that you can have one hash on two images, for example. There are other ways to abuse the CSAM system, which is confirmed by several researchers (one, two). And Apple saying it's not a concern... only to pull back on these plans.