YubiKey-Guide VS sops

Instead, most people generate keypair(s) on an airgapped machine and write them to two Yubikeys. Or write subkeys to a single Yubikey and keep a backup in encrypted form. See https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide

I'd recommend using the Yubikey as a GPG smartcard[1]. The private key stays on the Yubikey. I also use it for ssh. But make sure you have a backup key or two, just in case the primary Yubikey gives out. FIDO2 and all other regular Yubikey functionality still works with it.

[1]: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide

The excellent guide by drduh should be mentioned here: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide — I've been using this approach for years to store my OpenPGP keys on Yubikeys and use them for SSH.

I don't generate my keys on devices. That lets me be flexible and keep backups, as well as use the same keys on multiple physical devices. Using a single yubikey is a bad idea, as you're bound to eventually lose it or break it. Hasn't happened to me yet in 5 years, but I expect it to happen.

I followed this guide to generate a master key and three subkey.

See https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide . Also google for OpenPGP card specifications, they will answer your question

Regarding GPG/SSH keys, there is a great howto: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide

I'd be lying if I said I understood all of that. I'm definitely going to do some research ahaha. Someone else on this post sentence this like which they said was very good guide. https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide

When storing the key on a Yubikey, however, all you need is just the PIN in order to use the key. It can contain numbers, letters, symbols, etc. and can be quite long, so you can treat it as a passphrase for all intents and purposes. There are actually two PIN codes: one regular one, for a read access, and another administrative one, for write access for when you want to modify the gpg applet settings or the key on the Yubikey. There is also a limit to how many times in a row you can enter pins incorrectly, after which the gpg applet gets locked and the only thing you can do is reset it, erasing the PGP keys. See https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide for more information.

Try follow this guide from DrDuh https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide/blob/master/README.md

My script just sets up default .sops.yaml for https://github.com/getsops/sops

You can further edit .sops.yaml(eg have multiple of them) and decide how you split secrets in your directory tree to further customize who can decrypt the secrets.

It works pretty well for prod/dev splits, etc

Mozilla SOPS (Secrets OPerationS) is an open-source command-line tool for managing and storing secrets. It uses secure encryption methods to encrypt secrets at rest and decrypt them at runtime. SOPS supports a variety of key management systems, including AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault, and PGP. It's particularly useful in a DevOps context where sensitive data like API keys, passwords, or certificates need to be securely managed and seamlessly integrated into application workflows.

Encrypted secrets thanks to SOPS and Age

We do the exact same thing to keep track of some credentials we use sops[1] and AWS KMS to separate credentials by sensitivity, then use the git differ to view the diffs between the encrypted secrets

Definitely not best practice security-wise, but it works well

[1] https://github.com/getsops/sops

For anyone new to SOPS like I was - https://github.com/getsops/sops

I've found this is largely solved by strictly separating plain config and secrets, and then having secrets pull from GCP secret manager / vault / whatever.

You can then commit all the config (including the secret identifiers) and it all just works so long as you're authenticated with your secret storage system.

We do this for the live configuration as well in line with Gitops and find it to work well.

If you don't want to use a cloud secret manager you can also use something like https://github.com/getsops/sops to commit the encrypted secrets safely

Basically, the simpler the better --just encrypt your secrets and check them in to version control.

We use SOPS[0] for this, and have found it to be pretty nice.

[0]: https://github.com/getsops/sops

The answer is that secrets shouldn't be stored in the git repo at all, but somewhere safe like a password manager or Mozilla's SOPS which people seem to love.

Unfortunately, the SOPS project is in some sort of a limbo state and there has been quite a long period with limited maintenance and unclear position from Mozilla. Despite the project being accepted into the CNCF, it's still unclear what will happen with it going forward.