Ventoy VS systemd

Ventoy is an open-source tool to create a bootable USB drive for ISO/WIM/IMG/VHD(x)/EFI files. Using Ventoy, we can create live USB for multiple distros in one flash disk. This is a revolutionary feature compared to other tools, e.g., Etcher, Rufus, etc, that can only create one live USB at a time. This tool is so important. Don't call yourself a distro hopper if you don't know this tool.

I'm thinking you mean Ventoy? They say they can load vhd and img files, though I've only tried ISO's myself.

https://www.ventoy.net/

View on GitHub

I faced it too. There is a PR on the ventoy GitHub repository that fixes Proxmox boot.

https://github.com/ventoy/Ventoy/actions/runs/7088423200

> While this works, I find this method a bit tedious to use, at least compared to Ventoy [0].

I find ventoy more tedious, because you can't use it on your hard drive with a sane partitioning scheme.

The only reason is because of how the ventoy detection hardcode the partition boundaries in its checks, and it means Ventoy can only run with the partitions set in a way that may lead to alignment issues like write-amplification: I've detailed that in https://github.com/ventoy/Ventoy/issues/1342

Ideally I'd have a 10G partition after the EFI (or it could even be the EFI itself) with a few ISOs for rescue purposes + a UEFI entry to avoid having to use a bootable USB, but that's not possible with Ventoy unless I accept Ventoy choices of partition boundaries:

                (pMBR->PartTbl[0].StartSectorId != 2048 ||

I downloaded and made a bootable USB Ventoy (https://www.ventoy.net) with its Windows GUI app in my updated 64-bit W10 Pro PC. However, I couldn't seem to get VirtualBox v7.0.12 to boot it. I read VirtualBox can boot from bootable USB flash sticks so it should work. Am I missing something?

So, yes. The installer will need to install grub to that first partition. You can install ventoy to a usb drive, put a windows iso there and your q4os iso. In case you mess up big time, you can reinstall windows.

No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination of the project maintainer, and you have the galls to defend him? This is truly deranged stuff.

And again, there is no "vulnerability", there is simply a person that doesn't know how Linux works and has learned something new. Which again it's fine, nobody knows everything and we all learn new things everyday, it's just that normal and sensible people don't use that to make grand claims on social media and start harassment campaigns culminating in death threats.

Professional security researchers responsibly report real issues using the appropriate channels, such as defined at: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy this is not the work of a researcher, this is a grifter looking for self-promotion on social media.

> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default

5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.

7. POSIX allows it:

* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...

> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters

FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.

> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.

According to the man page source[0]:

> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`

and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.

In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.

(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...

bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...

the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237

PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...

There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them

Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?

There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550

This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.

The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550