TC1791_CAN_BSL VS sa2_seed_key

In addition to the RSA signature, all Simos18 code blocks are also checked against a simple CRC checksum. And, in this case, SBOOT tries to validate the CRC checksum before it validates the RSA signature. It turns out the CRC validation is performed using an address header, and the address header has weak bounds checking. So, we can ask the ECU to checksum the boot passwords, and send us the checksum back. Since CRC is not a cryptographic hash (it is reversible), we can use the CRC values to back-calculate the boot passwords. Unfortunately, we can't do this cleanly, because the high side of the address range IS correctly bounds-checked. So instead, we have to start the CRC checksum process, then rapidly reboot into the Tricore Bootstrap Loader and dump the contents of RAM, to see the intermediate/temporary CRC values that have been calculated for only the boot passwords. https://github.com/bri3d/TC1791_CAN_BSL/blob/main/bootloader.py#L113

SA2 Seed/Key: https://github.com/bri3d/sa2_seed_key VW AG Programming Mode Seed/Key is implemented using a byte code virtual machine shared across all VW control units. Other manufacturers have more or less secure Seed/Key mechanisms, but this one is interesting and clever.