SharpClipboard VS KeeFarce

Yes - for example https://github.com/slyd0g/SharpClipboard

This is designed to work with CobaltStrike, which is a tool used by security testers (i.e. redteams), but also by real life adversaries as well.

inb4 KeeFarce. It's 7 years old and only works in specific situations.

> isn't securing this one major IMO attack vector an improvement over not doing anything about it

Unfortunately securing this attack vector is costly - in the sense of annoying the user with prompts and access grants.

This is why even on mobile as you noticed, only browsers require user confirmation before allowing webpages access to the clipboard.

You could maybe do something in between, like not allowing clipboard access to processes which don't have a foreground window visible to the user.

But in practice, this attack vector is not exploited. If you are targeted, it's much more likely that a specific attack against the password manager is used, since it will extract ALL passwords, and not need to wait for one to show up:

> KeeFarce allows for the extraction of KeePass 2.x password database information from memory. The cleartext information, including usernames, passwords, notes and url's are dumped into a CSV file in %AppData%

https://github.com/denandz/KeeFarce

I'm not sure how that defeats the purpose of 2FA. If anything, critical things like 2FA codes being stored locally on your device are more dangerous. Just because it's online doesn't mean it is suddenly insecure. By your logic, password managers being online and cross-platform are also somehow insecure, yet everybody expects those as the most basic features. I don't want to get into a long-winded, pointless "everything on the internet is insecure!" discussion, but I just don't see your point.