SharpClipboard
KeeFarce
SharpClipboard | KeeFarce | |
---|---|---|
1 | 7 | |
172 | 989 | |
- | - | |
10.0 | 10.0 | |
about 4 years ago | over 8 years ago | |
C# | C++ | |
- | BSD 3-clause "New" or "Revised" License |
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SharpClipboard
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How the Clipboard Works
Yes - for example https://github.com/slyd0g/SharpClipboard
This is designed to work with CobaltStrike, which is a tool used by security testers (i.e. redteams), but also by real life adversaries as well.
KeeFarce
- KeePass Sicherheitslücke ist ein großes Problem!
- Diskussion um Schwachstelle in KeePass
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Open source security camera/CCTV apps?
inb4 KeeFarce. It's 7 years old and only works in specific situations.
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How the Clipboard Works
> isn't securing this one major IMO attack vector an improvement over not doing anything about it
Unfortunately securing this attack vector is costly - in the sense of annoying the user with prompts and access grants.
This is why even on mobile as you noticed, only browsers require user confirmation before allowing webpages access to the clipboard.
You could maybe do something in between, like not allowing clipboard access to processes which don't have a foreground window visible to the user.
But in practice, this attack vector is not exploited. If you are targeted, it's much more likely that a specific attack against the password manager is used, since it will extract ALL passwords, and not need to wait for one to show up:
> KeeFarce allows for the extraction of KeePass 2.x password database information from memory. The cleartext information, including usernames, passwords, notes and url's are dumped into a CSV file in %AppData%
https://github.com/denandz/KeeFarce
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Google Authenticator's first update in years tweaks how you access security codes
I'm not sure how that defeats the purpose of 2FA. If anything, critical things like 2FA codes being stored locally on your device are more dangerous. Just because it's online doesn't mean it is suddenly insecure. By your logic, password managers being online and cross-platform are also somehow insecure, yet everybody expects those as the most basic features. I don't want to get into a long-winded, pointless "everything on the internet is insecure!" discussion, but I just don't see your point.
- Why I don't hear about malware targetting password managers?
What are some alternatives?
clipman - A simple clipboard manager for Wayland
google-authenticator-exporter - Get the TOTP secrets exported by Google Authenticator
KeeThief - Methods for attacking KeePass 2.X databases, including extracting of encryption key material from memory.
LaZagne - Credentials recovery project
KeePassHax - A tool to extract a KeePass master password from memory
1PasswordSuite - Utilities to extract secrets from 1Password
Aegis - A free, secure and open source app for Android to manage your 2-step verification tokens.
AuthenticatorPro - 📱 Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) client for Android + Wear OS
VaultBreaker - A toolset designed for attacks against common password managers.
andOTP - [Unmaintained] Open source two-factor authentication for Android