OpenDoas
util-linux
OpenDoas | util-linux | |
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29 | 35 | |
600 | 2,485 | |
- | 1.5% | |
0.0 | 9.9 | |
about 2 months ago | 1 day ago | |
C | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
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For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
OpenDoas
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A simple guide for configuring sudo and doas
Aditionally,because doas was developed for OpenBSD,it also retains some of its quirks,like how user-installed executables are stored in /usr/local/bin,in contrast to /usr/bin where Linux stores them. As a result,doas can have problems on Linux so the following workaround can be used:
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The First Stable Release of a Rust-Rewrite Sudo Implementation
https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/106
That's a pretty severe unsolved security issue.
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Doas – dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor
2. https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/blob/master/timestamp.c
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Testing the memory safe Rust implementation of Sudo/Su
If you want to move away from Sudo, but don't want to try this rust implementation just yet, I have had great success with OpenBSD's doas. It has been ported to every Linux distro I know of as well:
https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas
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Doas Mastery (2019)
There are, at both ends. Both the "script kiddies" who cannot deviate from scripts because they lack almost any knowledge at all; and the knowledgeable ones who know that there are subtle differences between sudo and doas which require doing things slightly differently to achieve the same effect.
* https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/116#issuecomment-...
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Help me on gentoo
Doas makes more in openbsd world In linux there are many api that need to be changed for porting, i'm no expert but the port might be flawed as not many developers has checked the codebase And how can you explain this vulnerability https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/106
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Linux users who are paranoid about security.... what's your opinion about OpenBSD?
Personally I'd prefer running Qubes OS, if only my device would have been more powerful. Currently I'm on Fedora Silverblue as I believe it provides a decent middle-ground in which I'm more secure than almost any other Linux distro while not losing any (meaningful) functionality. I do make use of doas and other technologies inspired from OpenBSD to further enhance the security.
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Sudo and Su Being Rewritten in Rust for Memory Safety
Why not port https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas to rust instead?
If the goal is security, then there is more to it than just using a memory safe language. Otherwise the result of this, possibly unwittingly, seems performative.
- Bringing Memory Safety to sudo and su
- Using doas instead of sudo on Debian 11
util-linux
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The First Stable Release of a Rust-Rewrite Sudo Implementation
There are su and runuser in util-linux (GPL-2.0) [1].
[1]: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/tree/master/login-u...
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Simula the Forgotten Programming Language
>It remained in the "getty" process for some time, well into the {Free,Net,Open}BSD era.
Still there in agetty: https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/blob/master/term-ut... And, I imagine in other getty implementations.
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Don't abuse su for dropping user privileges (2015)
TIOCSTI is irrelevant. When one is dropping privileges, in a system cron job or in a process supervised by one's favourite service management system, there is no terminal involved. TIOCSTI simply doesn't enter into the picture at all.
Only when one is in a terminal login session and using su to elevate / add privileges, does TIOCSTI become relevant. But no-one here is saying not to use su to add privileges.
People blame su, sudo, and (as the person at https://github.com/slicer69/doas/issues/110 did) doas for this feature of operating system kernels. The right thing to do with TIOCSTI it to just eliminate it from the kernel. OpenBSD did back in version 6.
Sadly, the argument from Alan Cox, Linux developer, when this was proposed years ago was that it should stay in Linux, and all of the programs like su, sudo, and doas should have even more things to do in the parent process that sticks around, namely pump I/O to and from a controlling pseudo-terminal that su/sudo/doas sets up for the shell subprocess, breaking (as the maintainer of OpenDoas pointed out) the long-standing notion that the child processes belong to the same terminal session and share things like a single getlogname() with the login shell.
6 years after https://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/05/10/3... and https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/06/03/9, there is no sign of anyone doing anything of the sort in any su or doas implementation. (It was briefly in one su implementation, but taken out in 2017 for being a "stupid hack": https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/23f75093264a...)
Fortunately, some six months ago Linux developers finally made TIOCSTI removable and the right course of action is available to those that want it: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20221228205726.rfevry7ud6gmttg5...
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Desktop Suddenly Failing to Boot - what are these error messages?
Huh, I will try this later. Bit confused by the instructions on the Archwiki but I think I can figure it out. Thanks so much for the help. Btw, it seems you were right on what was wrong. Good eyes.
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Capture your users attention with style
So, this script serves as a pretty good wall replacement (wall will strip all escape/control sequences other than \007, by the way).
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How do you find the developers for obscure stuff
The login program (used for terminal logins) is part of the util-linux project: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Util-linux
- hexdump nonsense error messages
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Would you use/try snaps if it has open source backend?
if anbody actually at Canonical is reading this and wants me (and others) to take snaps seriously, please consider submitting pull requests to some of the core cli tool projects impacted by the way you guys abuse the loop device mechanism. Something simple like the ability to export HIDE_SNAP_MOUNTS=1 that gets picked up by the impacted tools in util-linux (lsblk, mount, blkid, fdisk, etc) and gnu coreutils (du, df) and simply hides the lines related to loop device mounts would go a long way - preferably only the ones added by snap but even an option to hide all of them would be better than nothing.
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Best Way For Copying Between 2 PC's With Different UIDs via USB
Pick a different filesystem, or wait for this feature to land in util-linux.
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Are DOS utilities open source.
Also a data format. Reasonably easy to find a spec (the wikipedia article should be sufficient to implement it). Also reasonably easy to find Free Software implementations, such as fdisk.
What are some alternatives?
doas - A port of OpenBSD's doas which runs on FreeBSD, Linux, NetBSD, and illumos
coreutils - upstream mirror
runas - An alternative to sudo and doas written in Rust
bindfs - Mount a directory elsewhere with changed permissions.
nixpkgs - Nix Packages collection & NixOS
gimp - Read-only mirror of https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gimp
bedrocklinux-userland - This tracks development for the things such as scripts and (defaults for) config files for Bedrock Linux
sanitizers - AddressSanitizer, ThreadSanitizer, MemorySanitizer
tako - Run commands as another user
linuxgems - A succinct cheat sheet for newbie linux coders and system administrators, documenting some of the more obscure and useful gems of linux lore. Intended to be viewed in emacs org-mode, or VimOrganizer, though any text editor will suffice.
koyo - Run commands as another user
subsync - Subtitle Speech Synchronizer