OpenDoas
systemd
OpenDoas | systemd | |
---|---|---|
29 | 518 | |
600 | 12,516 | |
- | 1.6% | |
0.0 | 10.0 | |
about 2 months ago | 2 days ago | |
C | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 or later | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
OpenDoas
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A simple guide for configuring sudo and doas
Aditionally,because doas was developed for OpenBSD,it also retains some of its quirks,like how user-installed executables are stored in /usr/local/bin,in contrast to /usr/bin where Linux stores them. As a result,doas can have problems on Linux so the following workaround can be used:
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The First Stable Release of a Rust-Rewrite Sudo Implementation
https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/106
That's a pretty severe unsolved security issue.
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Doas – dedicated OpenBSD application subexecutor
2. https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/blob/master/timestamp.c
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Testing the memory safe Rust implementation of Sudo/Su
If you want to move away from Sudo, but don't want to try this rust implementation just yet, I have had great success with OpenBSD's doas. It has been ported to every Linux distro I know of as well:
https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas
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Doas Mastery (2019)
There are, at both ends. Both the "script kiddies" who cannot deviate from scripts because they lack almost any knowledge at all; and the knowledgeable ones who know that there are subtle differences between sudo and doas which require doing things slightly differently to achieve the same effect.
* https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/116#issuecomment-...
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Help me on gentoo
Doas makes more in openbsd world In linux there are many api that need to be changed for porting, i'm no expert but the port might be flawed as not many developers has checked the codebase And how can you explain this vulnerability https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas/issues/106
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Linux users who are paranoid about security.... what's your opinion about OpenBSD?
Personally I'd prefer running Qubes OS, if only my device would have been more powerful. Currently I'm on Fedora Silverblue as I believe it provides a decent middle-ground in which I'm more secure than almost any other Linux distro while not losing any (meaningful) functionality. I do make use of doas and other technologies inspired from OpenBSD to further enhance the security.
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Sudo and Su Being Rewritten in Rust for Memory Safety
Why not port https://github.com/Duncaen/OpenDoas to rust instead?
If the goal is security, then there is more to it than just using a memory safe language. Otherwise the result of this, possibly unwittingly, seems performative.
- Bringing Memory Safety to sudo and su
- Using doas instead of sudo on Debian 11
systemd
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Run0 – systemd based alternative to sudo announced
> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default
5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.
7. POSIX allows it:
* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...
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Systemd Rolling Out "run0" As sudo Alternative
> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters
FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.
> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.
According to the man page source[0]:
> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`
and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.
In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.
(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)
[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...
- Crash-only software: More than meets the eye
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Systemd Wants to Expand to Include a Sudo Replacement
bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...
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"Run0" as a Sudo Replacement
the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237
PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/
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Linux fu: getting started with systemd
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...
There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them
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Ubuntu 24.04 (and Debian) removed libsystemd from SSH server dependencies
Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?
There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550
This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.
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Systemd minimizing required dependencies for libsystemd
The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550
- Going in circles without a real-time clock
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The xz sshd backdoor rabbithole goes quite a bit deeper
I find this the most plausible explanation by far:
* The highly professional outfit simply did not see teknoraver's commit to remove liblzma as standard dependency of systemd build scripts coming.
* The race was on between their compromised code and that commit. They had to win it, with as large a window as possible.
* This caused serious errors.
* The performance regression is __not__ big. It's lucky Andres caught it at all. It's also not necessarily all that simple to remove it. It's not simply a bug in a loop or some such.
* The payload of the 'hack' contains fairly easy ways for the xz hackers to update the payload. They actually used it to remove a real issue where their hackery causes issues with valgrind that might lead to discovering it, and they also used it to release 5.6.1 which rewrites significant chunks; I've as yet not read, nor know of any analysis, as to why they changed so much.
Extra info for those who don't know:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/commit/3fc72d54132151c131...
That's a commit that changes how liblzma is a dependency of systemd. Not because the author of this commit knew anything was wrong with it. But, pretty much entirely by accident (although removing deps was part of the point of that commit), almost entirely eliminates the value of all those 2 years of hard work.
And that was with the finish line in sight for the xz hackers: On 24 feb 2024, the xz hackers release liblzma 5.6.0 which is the first fully operational compromised version. __12 days later systemd merges a commit that means it won't work__.
So now the race is on. Can they get 5.6.0 integrated into stable releases of major OSes _before_ teknoraver's commit that removes liblzma's status as direct dep of systemd?
I find it plausible that they knew about teknoraver's commit _just before_ Feb 24th 2024 (when liblzma v5.6.0 was released, the first backdoored release), and rushed to release ASAP, before doing the testing you describe. Buoyed by their efforts to add ways to update the payload which they indeed used - March 8th (after teknoraver's commit was accepted) it was used to fix the valgrind issue.
So, no, I don't find this weird, and I don't think the amateurish aspects should be taken as some sort of indication that parts of the outfit were amateuristic. As long as it's plausible that the amateuristic aspects were simply due to time pressure, it sounds like a really bad idea to make assumptions in this regard.
What are some alternatives?
doas - A port of OpenBSD's doas which runs on FreeBSD, Linux, NetBSD, and illumos
openrc - The OpenRC init system
runas - An alternative to sudo and doas written in Rust
tini - A tiny but valid `init` for containers
nixpkgs - Nix Packages collection & NixOS
inotify-tools - inotify-tools is a C library and a set of command-line programs providing a simple interface to inotify.
bedrocklinux-userland - This tracks development for the things such as scripts and (defaults for) config files for Bedrock Linux
s6 - The s6 supervision suite.
tako - Run commands as another user
earlyoom - earlyoom - Early OOM Daemon for Linux
koyo - Run commands as another user
supervisor - Supervisor process control system for Unix (supervisord)