LavaMoat
birdcage
LavaMoat | birdcage | |
---|---|---|
16 | 13 | |
824 | 173 | |
2.7% | 1.2% | |
9.8 | 7.3 | |
7 days ago | about 1 month ago | |
JavaScript | Rust | |
MIT License | GNU General Public License v3.0 only |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
LavaMoat
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Ledger's NPM account has been hacked
Just yesterday I watched a talk [0] at WarsawJS about LavaMoat [1], a set of tools to protect against malicious behaviour from npm dependencies. Guess it’s time to look into it deeper.
[0]: https://naugtur.pl/pres3/lava/2023end.html
[1]: https://github.com/LavaMoat/LavaMoat
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Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
You are basically talking about Lavamoat. It provides tooling and policies for SES, which aims to make it into standards.
https://github.com/LavaMoat/LavaMoat
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Supply chain security - prevent, not avoid
Enter: lavamoat. https://github.com/LavaMoat/LavaMoat
- LavaMoat: Tools for sandboxing your dependency graph
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Deno.js in Production. Key Takeaways.
You should check out Lavamoat: https://github.com/LavaMoat/LavaMoat
It attempts to do what you're essentially describing. It was built by the MetaMask team, where supply chain attacks are an obviously huge risk.
I've spent some time trying to get it working in an app, but haven't been able to get it all the way working. It's still pretty beta and not well documented.
- Node.js packages don't deserve your trust
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How to respond to growing supply chain security risks?
And it is happening right now. Github is opening the GitHub Advisory Database to community submissions. Awesome community NodeSecure builds cool things like scanner and js-x-ray. There are also lockfile-lint, LavaMoat, Jfrog-npm-tools (and I am sure there is more).
- On node-ipc and the importance of trusting trust
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NPM package compromised by author: erases files on RU / BY computers on install
There is a proposal to add OCAPs on a language level in TC39[0]. There is already a drop-in implementation which already works in both Nodejs and browsers[1].
As a developer who wants to sandbox your own (recursive) dependencies, this is made accessible today in Lavamoat[2]. Basically a package or app can provide a policy manifest specifying which capabilities (e.g. network or filesystem access) should be granted for each dependency. Also comes with a tool that will auto-generate a starting point from your existing dependency tree.
IMO this is the future. Currently it does come with a performance penalty but hopefully this idea will catch on and make it into runtime implementations.
Lavamoat is still marked as "preprod" on npm but talking to the author it's a matter of days or weeks until the first stable release.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30703817
[1]: https://github.com/endojs/endo/tree/master/packages/ses
[2]: https://github.com/LavaMoat/LavaMoat
- Node runtime that sandboxes all NPM dependencies by default
birdcage
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Ledger's NPM account has been hacked
Co-funder @ Phylum here (https://phylum.io) We have been actively scanning dependencies across npm (and PyPI, RubyGems, Crates.io, etc.) for nearly three years now; quite successfully, I might add (https://blog.phylum.io/tag/research/). We _automatically_ hit on this package when it was published, and our research team has been all over it.
A collective of us are active in Discord (https://discord.gg/Fe6pr5eW6p), continuing to hunt attacks like these. If that's something that interests you, we'd love to have you!
In addition to this, we've released several open source tools to help protect against supply chain attacks:
1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage - Birdcage is a cross-platform embeddable sandbox that's been baked into our CLI (which wraps npm, pypi, etc.) to sandbox package installations
2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli - Our CLI provides an extension capability so you can lock down random executables you might use during your software development (define _what_ it's allowed to do, e.g. network access, and then lock it down with Birdcage)
We also have a variety of integrations, including Github, Gitlab, BitBucket, CircleCI, Tines, Sophos, etc.
https://docs.phylum.io/docs/integrations_overview
It's unfortunate that software dependency attacks continue to plague open source registries. It seems unlikely this will let up in the near future. We are continuing to work closely with the open source ecosystems to try and get these sorts of packages removed when they pop up.
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Cryptocurrency Miner Masquerading as GCC Compiler Found in NPM Package
To be clear, this particular package did not execute code during install, so the sandbox wouldn't have come into play, but it would have been blocked by the pre-check against Phylum's API.
Would greatly appreciate any feedback on our extensions and suggestions for improving our sandbox! We recently had a few individuals submit some great issues and suggestions, which we absolutely loved receiving.
Happy to answer any questions about software supply chain attacks or security in general!
1. https://blog.phylum.io/junes-sophisticated-npm-attack-attrib...
2. https://blog.phylum.io/rust-malware-staged-on-crates-io/
3. https://blog.phylum.io/npm-emails-validator-package-malware/
4. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli
5. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
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Rust Malware Staged on Crates.io
We're actively working on this with our sandbox (https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage). We've wrapped the likes of pip, yarn, and npm already and are making moves to similarly provide support for cargo.
Currently comes as part of the Phylum CLI (https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli), so that doing something like:
phylum npm install
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Social engineering campaign targeting tech employees spreads through NPM malware
We (https://phylum.io) actually open sourced our sandbox for this exact purpose.
https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
It's baked into our CLI and supports limiting access to network, disk, etc. during package installation. For example, running something like
phylum npm install react
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Attackers Repurposing existing Python-based Malware for Distribution on NPM
We've open sourced our sandbox, which limits access to network/disk/etc. during package installation. In this way, nasty install scripts won't have the opportunity to ship your credentials/SSH keys off to a remote sever.
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Attackers are hiding malware in minified packages distributed to NPM
The sandbox is also open source and available for use by the community.
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Active Malware Campaign Targeting Popular Python Packages Underway
In addition to this, taking precautions to not install unknown packages is probably also extremely prudent. Towards that end, we've open sourced a cross platform embeddable sandbox for package installations. Source is freely available on Github (https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage) and we've added it into our tooling so you can run pip install ... and it'll limit access to disk, network, etc. during package installation.
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Supply Chain Attack Using PyPI Packages “Colorslib”, “Httpslib”, and “Libhttps”
Been working on this exact thing for nearly two years at https://www.phylum.io. We identified and reported about 1.2k packages in ecosystems like npm, pypi and others last year. GitHub app that checks your PRs for malware. We also built a free open source sandbox for package installations [1] so if malware does get executed it’s done in a locked down environment. Happy to chat further about this sort of thing, it’s something I’m wildly interested in!
[1] https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
- Ransomware currently being published to PyPI in ongoing campaign
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Ransomware Python Packages Currently Being Published to PyPI
(Disclaimer: I'm one of the co-founders at Phylum)
Our system has been alerting us to this actor's activities all morning (beginning sometime last night). They have been wildly active, and have continued to publish packages as we've worked to get them removed.
Interestingly, they have ported the Python bits to Javascript and have started publishing to NPM as well. Exact same TTP, crossing two ecosystems.
Our platform monitors these ecosystems, scanning packages for signs of risk as they are published. This way we can get them removed before they impact the wider open source community. We currently support Javascript, Typescript, Python, Ruby, Java, C# and recently just rolled out Golang and Rust support into beta.
We believe in a defense in depth approach to supply chain security and have also published an open source sandbox that limits access to the filesystem, network, disk and environment variables.
https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage
This is rolled into our CLI so that you can do things like `phylum npm install ` and install packages in a sandboxed way.
Happy to answer questions about this attack, security, sandboxes, etc!
What are some alternatives?
metamask-extension - :globe_with_meridians: :electric_plug: The MetaMask browser extension enables browsing Ethereum blockchain enabled websites
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
create-vue - 🛠️ The recommended way to start a Vite-powered Vue project
packj - Packj stops :zap: Solarwinds-, ESLint-, and PyTorch-like attacks by flagging malicious/vulnerable open-source dependencies ("weak links") in your software supply-chain
vue-cli - 🛠️ webpack-based tooling for Vue.js Development
conf - Simple config handling for your app or module
cli - the package manager for JavaScript
wapm-cli - 📦 WebAssembly Package Manager (CLI)
handlebars-helpers - 188 handlebars helpers in ~20 categories. Can be used with Assemble, Ghost, YUI, express.js etc.
lunasec - LunaSec - Dependency Security Scanner that automatically notifies you about vulnerabilities like Log4Shell or node-ipc in your Pull Requests and Builds. Protect yourself in 30 seconds with the LunaTrace GitHub App: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec/
EventSource - a polyfill for http://www.w3.org/TR/eventsource/
Contents - Community documentation, code, links to third-party resources, ... See the issues and pull requests for pending content. Contributions are welcome !