InitWare VS systemd

Fear not. They get to be part of the future too.

> Yes indeed, I should've expanded to requiring user namespaces and other kernel magic I can't expect from any random box i wanna work on.

That's fair, do have to make sure to avoid to modules that do user systemd services.

Longer term, though, I am hoping https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare will help with the userland part. And I hope to personally help with things like

https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-arch/2022-January...

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f8457e20-c3cc-6e56-96a4-3090d7d...

to get us more sane cross-platform system calls.

I know, but support is still in FreeBSD. My big long term plan is:

1. Work on FreeBSD cross in Nixpkgs, because I need a way to pin forks and run nice tests without going insane. (We already have NetBSD cross.)

2. Rig up a booting image that uses https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare, the fork of systemd.

3. Add support to CloudABI in initware.

4. Bang on drum for other OSes and upstream systemd to implement this stuff we can can good portable abstractions -- I think this is our best shot to get "portable containers".

I haven't bothered to have a beef with systemd, but some of us have discussed https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare to support non-Linux kernels. That would be really fun.

I'm the first to admit that I'm ignorant of the facts here, but seeing that a systemd fork ran on OpenBSD for the first time two months ago does not give me confidence that it's "an option" in the sense that you can trust it to work well.

And to be pedantic (this is an OpenBSD thread, after all), it's not "systemd", it's a fork of systemd called "InitWare", and the GitHub repo describes it as "alpha software".

Someone also pointed out in the discussion you linked that it doesn't seem to include journald. Here's a relevant PR: https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare/pull/27

The project GitHub is found at https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare

You may have heard of InitWare https://github.com/InitWare/InitWare. Discussions, note that one of the titles is misleading:

No, the OP was not sent any harassment, the OP _did_ the harassment as it can be seen in the tweets. I mean, they are right there, just click on the links you shared. One of the OP's followers even openly called for the assassination of the project maintainer, and you have the galls to defend him? This is truly deranged stuff.

And again, there is no "vulnerability", there is simply a person that doesn't know how Linux works and has learned something new. Which again it's fine, nobody knows everything and we all learn new things everyday, it's just that normal and sensible people don't use that to make grand claims on social media and start harassment campaigns culminating in death threats.

Professional security researchers responsibly report real issues using the appropriate channels, such as defined at: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/security/policy this is not the work of a researcher, this is a grifter looking for self-promotion on social media.

> 3. even `adduser` will not allow it by default

5. useradd does allow it (as noted in a comment). 6. Local users are not the only source, there things like LDAP and AD.

7. POSIX allows it:

* https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-...

> I for one love to type out 13 extra characters

FWIW, systemd is normally pretty good at providing autocomplete suggestions, so even if you don't want to set up an alias you'll probably just have to type `--b ` to set it.

> I wonder what random ASCII escape sequences we can send.

According to the man page source[0]:

> The color specified should be an ANSI X3.64 SGR background color, i.e. strings such as `40`, `41`, …, `47`, `48;2;…`, `48;5;…`

and a link to the relevant Wikipedia page[1]. Given systemd's generally decent track record wrt defects and security issues, and the simplicity of valid colour values, I expect there's a fairly robust parameter verifier in there.

In fact, given the focus on starting the elevated command in a highly controlled environment, I'd expect the colour codes to be output to the originating terminal, not forwarded to the secure pty. That way, the only thing malformed escapes can affect is your own process, which you already have full control over anyway.

(Happy to be shown if that's a mistaken expectation though.)

[0] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/main/man/run0.xml

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ANSI_escape_code#SGR_(Select_G...

bash & zsh are supported by upstream: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/tree/main/shell-completio...

the right person to replace sudo, not: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237

PS: https://pwnies.com/systemd-bugs/

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/32028#issuecomment...

There are some very compelling arguments made there if you care to read them

Maybe it was because you weren't pointing out anything new?

There was a pull request to stop linking libzma to systemd before the attack even took place

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550

This was likely one of many things that pushed the attackers to work faster, and forced them into making mistakes.

The PR for changing compression libraries to use dlopen() was opened several weeks before the xz-utils backdoor was revealed.

https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550