ContactDiscoveryService
matrix-doc
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ContactDiscoveryService | matrix-doc | |
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70 | 71 | |
270 | 749 | |
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0.0 | 9.5 | |
12 months ago | about 2 years ago | |
C | HTML | |
GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | Apache License 2.0 |
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ContactDiscoveryService
- Is it generally ok to store phone numbers in a firestore database?
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7 Best Open-Source Alternatives To WhatsApp In 2023
[1] https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
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WhatsApp data leak: 500M user records for sale
Signal uses SGX for remote attestation, which presumably lets the client verify that the code running on the server is a build of the OSS code and not a modified version. But I don't know the details or if this is reliable.
SGX and remote attestation described here:
https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
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WhatsApp data breach sees nearly 500 million user records up for sale
Signal does private contact discovery and the effort they've gone to to do this is quite impressive.
- A brief family story about convincing boomer parents to Signal
- Elon on Signal
- Absolutely Insane "Feature"
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Types of Execution Environments, Attestation and SGX
TEEs have numerous privacy-enhancing applications that may benefit users. One of them is, as discussed earlier, private contact discovery; the Signal application uses a contact discovery service enhanced using Intel SGX, a TEE technology, to protect its users' privacy. A similar application of TEEs is performing malware analysis in a remote cloud service, so that the service may not identify users by the contents of their devices, such as the applications they have installed, especially important as 98.93% of users may be uniquely identified by the list of applications they have installed.
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Twilio Incident: What Signal Users Need to Know
Signal (or, more accurately, one of its predecessors) used to use client-side private set intersection for contact discovery, but this scales poorly [1].
Now they use a solution based on Intel SGX and server-side trusted computing [2].
[1] https://signal.org/blog/contact-discovery/
[2] https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
- Where are Signal servers located and how is it safer than Swiss-based Threema ?
matrix-doc
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Are group video and audio calls encrypten?
Group voice and video calls are not E2EE, and use Jitsi, but this is expected to change with Native Group VoIP Signalling.
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So there's no online messaging service that's private, anonymous and secure?
DMs in Matrix are always E2EE, and MSC3401: Native Group VoIP Signalling means there should be E2EE in group calls.
- Element (Matrix) adds video/voice rooms
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Native Matrix VoIP with Element Call
From my perspective, the really exciting thing about this that it works equally well in mobile web browsers as well as desktop web - clicking on a link on Mobile Safari should Do The Right Thing without having to install anything.
Moreover, because it's built on Matrix, MSC3401 (https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/matthew/group-...) means that we'll finally have decentralised cascading video/voice conferences once the SFU (selective forwarding unit) component is added into the mix. So, for instance, users on the same homeserver will get their video feeds relayed locally with minimal latency... and then users on another remote homeserver will also get mixed locally with minimal latency, trunking the two together. If the link dies or one homeserver dies, the conference will keep going - i.e. precisely the same semantics as normal Matrix.
- Introducing Native Matrix VoIP with Element Call!
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Signal is more secure than Telegram from my understanding, but the fact that it needs a phone number makes me wary
What metadata does Matrix protect? Encrypted state events still aren't a thing for example https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/pull/3414 This means that server admins know what groups a given account is a member of, private or not, and they also have a general idea of what the topic of said groups are, even if they're encrypted. This would be a problem for groups about sensitive personal medical issues, like a private HIV survivors or Alcoholics Anonymous group.
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For those suggesting Guilded, Revolt, Signal, or what ever else as Discord alternatives, consider this potential problem inherent in those alternatives, even if two of them are open source
The protocol itself is flexible and can be changed through spec change proposals on their Github. They're currently working on implementing threads, and they recently implemented spaces, which functionally combine the concept of Discord servers and server folders. They can also be nested.
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How do I make a room with voice chat where people can leave and join without request like discord?
At the moment this only works with Jitsi. It will be implementet soon with MSC3401
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Discord is a black hole for information
Something we're trying to do about this on the Matrix side is MSC2716 (https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/blob/matthew/msc271...) - the ability to import archives of existing content into Matrix, and thus 'lock it open' and decentralise it for posterity: as long as one of the servers participating in that room stays alive (and the room is set up with infinite data retention, obviously) then the conversation will live on forever. (That MSC is also well worth a look for those interested in how Matrix works under the hood; MSC2716 was a surprisingly tricky problem to solve but it's basically finished now!).
Our first step will be to import all of Gitter's archives into Matrix - but we're then planning to add MSC2716 to all the existing Matrix bridges so that folks can use it to liberate chat history from Discord and Slack if desired, and avoid it getting paywalled/siloed/lost/held-hostage forever. We're also expecting to do USENET, mailing lists, forums, public IRC channels which have explicitly opted into logging... and generally archive as much possible in an open decentralised fashion, and ensure that gatekeepers can't lock up and blackhole info going forwards. After all, information longs to be free :)
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Matrix v1.2 Specification
by 'broken links' i guess you mean https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-doc/issues/3628? it's a bug on the new spec website; we're working on it.
What are some alternatives?
whatsapp-viewer - Small tool to display chats from the Android msgstore.db database (crypt12)
matterbridge - bridge between mattermost, IRC, gitter, xmpp, slack, discord, telegram, rocketchat, twitch, ssh-chat, zulip, whatsapp, keybase, matrix, microsoft teams, nextcloud, mumble, vk and more with REST API (mattermost not required!)
TextSecure - A private messenger for Android.
Mumble - Mumble is an open-source, low-latency, high quality voice chat software.
Signal-Server - Server supporting the Signal Private Messenger applications on Android, Desktop, and iOS
Synapse - Synapse: Matrix homeserver written in Python/Twisted.
TelegramAndroid - Fork client of Telegram app for Android.
Mastodon - Your self-hosted, globally interconnected microblogging community
simplex-chat - SimpleX - the first messaging network operating without user identifiers of any kind - 100% private by design! iOS, Android and desktop apps 📱!
Ferdi - Ferdi is a free and opensource all-in-one desktop app that helps you organize how you use your favourite apps
element-ios - A glossy Matrix collaboration client for iOS
matrix-docker-ansible-deploy - 🐳 Matrix (An open network for secure, decentralized communication) server setup using Ansible and Docker