BangleApps VS tpm2-totp

You can fo so by going on https://banglejs.com/apps, then in the More... tab you'll see a section called Device info > Apps Installed

You should take a look at Bangle https://github.com/espruino/BangleApps, it does pretty much this, it's running a js engine on the MCU and you can download apps and run them just like you describe.

But I am still wondering where this code in my screenshot comes from. I suppose it is telling the calling env how to clean up after it. But I couldnt find anything about that on the git repo. It is there tho when loaded through the app loader. https://github.com/espruino/BangleApps/tree/master/apps/lcars

AGPS data just enables the Watch to get a position in a few seconds. It can get the information (almanac) from the satellites but this takes several minutes of constant direct view to clear sky. Which of the agps apps did you try? https://banglejs.com/apps/?q=agps

So far I only have used the Browser based "Assisted GPS Updater (AGPS)" one and so far have no issues.

Depending on your messagegui App, in the default Message UI one just touch the icon on the left of the title bar and then choose Mark all as read, more details here. However, I can recommend the newer Message List App which has a much nicer interface, in my opinion, and provides a dedicated button for dismissing all messages.

Their "app store" is online [0] and you can actually review the source code for all of the apps on it by clicking the github icon on each entry, here's one for example [1]

[0] https://banglejs.com/apps/?c=game

[1] https://github.com/espruino/BangleApps/tree/master/apps/blac...

Not for PineTime, but the bangle.js has a a 2FA TOTP app: https://banglejs.com/apps/?id=authentiwatch

https://banglejs.com - $95

BangleJS should fit your requirements pretty well. It's a Chinese made smartwatch sold with a custom open and hackable rom. It pairs to android via Gabdgetbridge which is FOSS too

Here's a JavaScript smart watch running that - Bangle.js.

You need a TPM 2.0 compatible CPU, but something like this sounds really excellent: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp

This means your laptop itself would be your hardware device, the TOTP secret would be stored in the TPM and theoretically impossible to steal/copy. Of course this means you will probably want a mobile device (possibly a second laptop also) as a backup.)

>But okay, you may extend my attack by saying that you exchange the motherboard between the victim and the attacker laptop, so that you don't need to replicate the chassis.

Modern computers has tamper detection and if you open them you'll need to type the BIOS password.

However, replacing the motherboard is going to replace the TPM. This is easily detectable with something like tpm2_totp in the bootchain.

https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp

You could also use TOTP for a kind of remote attestation (e.g., with your phone computing TOTP). In this setup, the CPU sends the timestamp to the TPM, and it returns the TOTP value. So instead of you looking at your phone to give the TOTP to a service provider to prove that you're in possession of your phone, the computer gives you a TOTP value to prove that it's in possession (inside the TPM, sealed to the boot chain hashes) of the TOTP secret, and you use your phone to verify this. A possible weakness (short of a full-blown TPM compromise) would be to send a bunch of forged timestamps to the TPM while your computer is running and store the resulting TOTP values, then tamper with Secure Boot and emit the precomputed TOTP corresponding to the current timestamp whenever you boot up your computer. But this would require running malicious code on your compute while you're logged in with the trusted boot chain.