simplexmq VS session-android

Of course https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq

It's about ntf-server-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64 https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/releases/tag/v5.1.3

Also, it is covered in whitepaper here: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/blob/stable/protocol/overview-tjr.md

Please review the whitepaper and / or website home page. I also wrote this post some time ago about why I believe that using pairwise identifiers should be a minimal requirement for a communication system to be considered private.

For more information see Simplex development roadmap xftp branch in github

The source code: https://github.com/simplex-chat/simplexmq/tree/xftp

You can download XFTP CLI (Linux) to send and receive files via the command line here - you need the file named xftp-ubuntu-20_04-x86-64, rename it to xftp.

We absolutely should assume they can be compromised, but as SimpleX servers do not participate in the initial key exchange for e2e encryption, the server compromise will not lead to the compromise of e2e encryption security. I wrote more on MITM issue in this post. Further, the threat model here explains other consequences of compromised SimpleX servers.

Other alternatives include Session (free) and Threema (paid - 5€).

Test it by downloading session at getsession.org and DM the bot by starting a new message and sending it to “Simple” (without quotes)

Figured there should be moves to set one up if not - https://getsession.org/

* marketing "Perfect Forward Secrecy" AKA "Forward Secrecy"[0].

I favor Session Private Messenger[1] because it is decentralized and allows third party clients, but Signal enthusiasts warn me that the Session client may, hypothetically, at some future date, integrate a cryptocurrency, as the Signal client already does[2].

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy

[1] https://getsession.org

[2] https://www.stephendiehl.com/blog/signal.html

If you have a mobile phone number, the domestic intelligence agency knows exactly where you are at all times and any LEO (without a warrant) can also find you. In addition, there have been numerous CCC presentations showing how insecure the global (excluding US) and (separately) US carriers are guilty of promiscuous metadata trafficking ($$) and insecure SS7 setups. As a consequence, for low $, you can go to any one of several shady websites and find the last location of almost any phone number (person unique ID) globally. There are additional varying exploitable vulnerabilities depending on the exact combination of {handset x carrier x country} to impersonate them, tap their line, reveal their exact location, and redirect their phone number through a third-party handset or even a PBX. These are more expensive and some capabilities are forbidden for all but a few selective intelligence uses.

Session (Signal fork) doesn't use phone numbers. It's pretty well-designed overall and uses an onion routing approach. It's already a superset of Signal except it doesn't use phone numbers. https://getsession.org

Also look interesting:

* (unproven) https://www.olvid.io/technology

* (unproven) https://simplex.chat

PS: Using regular TOR on home broadband or cloud servers is relatively risky and inefficient. Sybil attacks on it are common. And to network operators and security agencies it gives an easy "flow tag" of your uplink and exit node data traffic as automatically suspicious.