reentrancy-attacks
A chronological and (hopefully) complete list of reentrancy attacks to date. (by pcaversaccio)
LiquidityPoolExample
Example Certora verification for a simple multi-contract system (by Certora)
Our great sponsors
| reentrancy-attacks | LiquidityPoolExample | |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | |
| 1,206 | 1 | |
| - | - | |
| 7.7 | 5.6 | |
| 13 days ago | 6 months ago | |
| Solidity | ||
| GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 | - |
The number of mentions indicates the total number of mentions that we've tracked plus the number of user suggested alternatives.
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
reentrancy-attacks
Posts with mentions or reviews of reentrancy-attacks.
We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives
and similar projects. The last one was on 2022-12-02.
-
A look into formal verification of smart contracts using Certora
The main challenge is dealing with non-view functions. The default behavior of the prover is to assume that an external call can alter all state on every contract but the caller, noted as HAVOC_ECF. This can lead to state changes in external contracts that are unreachable, making verification more difficult. Furthermore, it assumes that the call is non-reentrant, which in reality is a frequent source of attacks. This last issue can be avoided by indicating that calls can re-enter, noted as HAVOC_ALL, but this means that an external call can mutate any state in any contract, caller included. This leaves the contract being verified in a state where we don't know anything about it after an external call is made. This severely limits what we can prove.
LiquidityPoolExample
Posts with mentions or reviews of LiquidityPoolExample.
We have used some of these posts to build our list of alternatives
and similar projects. The last one was on 2022-12-02.
-
A look into formal verification of smart contracts using Certora
Certora's tutorial on github is also a great starting point for the basic concepts, though the lessons for more advanced ones are still under development. The documentation provides a good overview and reference for many concepts, though it's also a work in progress, and redirects to an older set of docs for the more advanced ones. A multi-contract example repo is a good complement to see the documented concepts in action.
What are some alternatives?
When comparing reentrancy-attacks and LiquidityPoolExample you can also consider the following projects:
the-dao-hack-simulation - A simulation of the infamous DAO hack from 2016
bamboo - Bamboo see https://github.com/cornellblockchain/bamboo
openzeppelin-contracts - OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development.
Tutorials - Practical tutorials of Certora Prover