harden-runner VS GHSA-pjwm-rvh2-c87w

Fortunately there is a great free online tool that help you by doing all the hard work (it will open a pull-request and automatically fix issues).

If using GitHub Actions for CI/ CD, Harden Runner (https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner) can be used to audit and block DNS exfiltration. Outbound calls from CI are predictable (to source repo, artifact registry, etc.) and don't change often.

As part of writing tests for Harden Runner GitHub Action, which prevents such attacks, there was a need to write attack simulator for these attacks.

I am not too familiar with GitLab, to be honest, but: - Commit/PR linting (to be in tandem with semantic versioning) is implemented via third-party GitHub Actions (https://github.com/amannn/action-semantic-pull-request and https://github.com/wagoid/commitlint-github-action), these might be hard to transfer - Blocking egress to mitigate supply chain attacks is performed by step security’s Harden Runner (https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner), you may raise a question there about GitLab support - CodeQL support is GitHub only AFAIK (but you would have to verify it)

I've found StepSecurity's tooling helpful in getting my repos secured.

* https://app.stepsecurity.io/securerepo

I agree. There are projects such as https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis and https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner that do behavior analysis. Disclaimer: I’m maintainer of the second one.

So if you are concerned about this, I'd suggest looking at the following:

* OpenSSF Scorecard Action - https://github.com/ossf/scorecard#scorecards-github-action

* Step Security Harden Action - https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner

I realize that this means trusting these providers but they seem at least tacitly blessed by GitHub. https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides/security-...

Few hours back several malicious packages were released on npm registry. This video shows how some of these packages are making outbound calls as part of the preinstall step when executed in a GitHub Actions workflow. DNS Exfiltration and network calls detected by Harden-Runner GitHub Action https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner

The SUNSPOT malware, Codecov breach, and lot of compromised open-source packages (like was the case with ua-parser-js) target the CI/ CD pipeline to modify release build or exfiltrate credentials.

I think you are misunderstanding the attack vector in the article you linked. This isn't the same thing we were discussing, please see https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pjwm-rvh2-c87w. This was not a compromise designed to go after the visitors of the website so far as I can tell (and even if it were, it couldn't do much except possibly steal a password if you entered it on a compromised site or steal cookie data). This was designed to target people who were using the library in their software, aka, it was targeting the build-chain of the developers, and many devs and companies as a result had computers compromised when the updated their versions, which caused the compromised version to download to their computers.

Github has published an advisory for the package https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pjwm-rvh2-c87w