google-authenticator
tpm2-totp
google-authenticator | tpm2-totp | |
---|---|---|
24 | 5 | |
4,501 | 149 | |
- | 7.4% | |
0.8 | 0.0 | |
over 3 years ago | about 1 month ago | |
Java | C | |
Apache License 2.0 | BSD 3-clause "New" or "Revised" License |
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google-authenticator
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GitHub will disable non-2FA accounts?
otpauth:// is a de-factor standard, since Google Authenticator uses it: https://github.com/google/google-authenticator/wiki/Key-Uri-...
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Creating 2fa with pyotp
Random question if you're using TOTP why not just give the user the secret when signing up as a Google Authenticator URI encoded in a QR code? Then you won't need to futz around with sending it to them afterwards. You can even use a library like qrcode.js so you don't generate the barcode server side either.
- why are all the totp secrets different styles?
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Locker: Store secrets on your local file system.
Locker can generate Time Based OTP codes parsing TOTP urls stored under a special key named totp.
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Does changing an email that has TOTP setup affect the "secret"?
(Examples> https://github.com/google/google-authenticator/wiki/Key-Uri-Format)
- Google Authenticator open source fork archived
- TOTP tokens on my wrist with the smartest dumb watch
- LastPass gehackt, Nutzerdaten aber anscheinend sicher
- Is google authenticator Private & Secure (Trustworthy) enough to be used for 2StepVerification?
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Twilio, the people who own Authy, got hacked
If we're talking about the encrypted Authy TOTP secrets and IF they get cracked or guessed, Authy does store the email in the name of the item. Having the name, service and the secret within the QR code's URI is normal and the standard for TOTP. The only thing the hackers won't have is the password.
tpm2-totp
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TOTP tokens on my wrist with the smartest dumb watch
You need a TPM 2.0 compatible CPU, but something like this sounds really excellent: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
This means your laptop itself would be your hardware device, the TOTP secret would be stored in the TPM and theoretically impossible to steal/copy. Of course this means you will probably want a mobile device (possibly a second laptop also) as a backup.)
- Can you detect tampering in /boot without SecureBoot on Linux?
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Authenticated Boot and Disk Encryption on Linux
>But okay, you may extend my attack by saying that you exchange the motherboard between the victim and the attacker laptop, so that you don't need to replicate the chassis.
Modern computers has tamper detection and if you open them you'll need to type the BIOS password.
However, replacing the motherboard is going to replace the TPM. This is easily detectable with something like tpm2_totp in the bootchain.
https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-totp
- Attest computer secure boot state to phone via time-based OTP and TPM
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Does the TPM boost secure boot security?
You could also use TOTP for a kind of remote attestation (e.g., with your phone computing TOTP). In this setup, the CPU sends the timestamp to the TPM, and it returns the TOTP value. So instead of you looking at your phone to give the TOTP to a service provider to prove that you're in possession of your phone, the computer gives you a TOTP value to prove that it's in possession (inside the TPM, sealed to the boot chain hashes) of the TOTP secret, and you use your phone to verify this. A possible weakness (short of a full-blown TPM compromise) would be to send a bunch of forged timestamps to the TPM while your computer is running and store the resulting TOTP values, then tamper with Secure Boot and emit the precomputed TOTP corresponding to the current timestamp whenever you boot up your computer. But this would require running malicious code on your compute while you're logged in with the trusted boot chain.
What are some alternatives?
Aegis - A free, secure and open source app for Android to manage your 2-step verification tokens.
sbctl - :computer: :lock: :key: Secure Boot key manager
pyotp - Python One-Time Password Library
mortar - Framework to join Linux's physical security bricks.
keepassxc - KeePassXC is a cross-platform community-driven port of the Windows application “Keepass Password Safe”.
btrfs-todo - An issues only repo to organize our TODO items
ios-application - A native, lightweight and secure one-time-password (OTP) client built for iOS; Raivo OTP!
heads - A minimal Linux that runs as a coreboot or LinuxBoot ROM payload to provide a secure, flexible boot environment for laptops, workstations and servers.
andOTP - [Unmaintained] Open source two-factor authentication for Android
cryptboot - Encrypted boot partition manager with UEFI Secure Boot support
two-factor-auth - Two Factor Authentication Java code implementing the Time-based One-time Password Algorithm
decrypt-otpauth-files - Decrypt files created by OTP Auth