codeql-coding-standards
misra-rust
codeql-coding-standards | misra-rust | |
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3 | 8 | |
107 | 112 | |
3.7% | 0.0% | |
9.8 | 0.0 | |
5 days ago | almost 3 years ago | |
CodeQL | Rust | |
MIT License | MIT License |
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codeql-coding-standards
- Misra C++:2023 Published
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Porsche Open Source Platform
This comment chain appears to have a fundamental misconception of what constitutes safe and what does not.
Automotive standards and automotive coding standards approach safety in a different way than most people think (and given your comments I would say this includes you). If you're curious, you can have a look at some rules to evaluate automotive code that are published here: https://github.com/github/codeql-coding-standards
In short, the rules do not aim to eliminate failure or crashes, but rather make the crash predictable and uniform when a crash occurs so that it can be dealt with. This is further complicated by where and how the automotive manufacture chooses to implement safety controls. It is entirely possible to have a bunch of unsafe code running somewhere on a car, and simply have a small safety shim around said code that prevents the unsafe code from impacting the safe operation of the vehicle.
With that in mind, let's take the example that you use here of emissions cheating software. Emissions is likely not considered safety relevant (it might not even be QM, it just might be some code) and so no safety requirement applies to it. So, no real scrutiny would happen there regardless, at least from a safety perspective. See, validating that software passes a particular safety certification is time and money intensive and manufacturers therefore keep the amount of code that they qualify as safe to a minimum. This means as an example that the infotainment systems of many manufacturers are not safety relevant and no safety function should exist on or interact with them.
A few other things to consider from other threads:
- Telsa doesn't necessarily follow or adhere to safety standards. They (Telsa) are explicitly non-compliant in some cases, and this is partially why there are investigations into their practices.
- Industrial robotics code is just as bad if not worse than most automotive software from what I've seen. As you note, its that these robots are not under manual control
- None of this prevents the software from being open source. There are plenty of safety qualified open source projects. This simply limits who can contribute and how contributions are managed. The main reason why many things in automotive are not open source is that the ECU manufacturer isn't interested in doing so, and the Tier 1/2/3 that does the implementation is even less so.
- CodeQL support for Autosar and Cert C++
misra-rust
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United States White House Report on Memory Safe Programming [pdf]
MISRA and Ferrocene are not really related.
MISRA is, as you say, a set of rules for writing C code, that restrict what you can do.
Ferrocene is a qualified compiler. You write any normal Rust code you want: it's still the upstream Rust compiler. There are no restrictions.
Incidentally, someone has compared what MISRA does to what Rust does: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
Given that they can't repeat the MISRA stuff there, it's a bit disjoined, but it sure is interesting!
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Misra C++:2023 Published
A fun github repo: "what would MISRA look like applied to Rust" https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
(They're comparing with the C version, not the C++ version...)
- Memory Safe Languages in Android 13
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Ferrocene: Rust toolchain to safety-critical environments
> There are huge swathes of MISRA which forbid things which not only aren't possible in Rust or SPARK
I can't vouch for its accuracy, but https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust
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High Assurance Rust: Developing Secure and Robust Software
When it comes to MISRA C, it is interesting to note how many (a majority) of its rules do not apply or have native enforcement[1].
You might have also seen the AUTOSTAR Rust in Automotive Working Group announcement recently[2].
[1]: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
[2]: for some reason the announcement was removed from the "News and events" site, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache%3Ahttp... but it is still available as a PDF https://www.autosar.org/fileadmin/user_upload/20220308_RustW...
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AUTOSAR announces new Working Group for Programming Language Rust in Automotive Software context
There's actually already a comparison: https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rules.md
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AdaCore and Ferrous Systems Joining Forces to Support Rust
Rust makes quite a few things more rigorous (e.g. pairing allocations with deallocations and reference validity). It basically fulfills the job of a static analyzer baked into the language.
It's also a vastly more analyzable language (in that its syntax is reasonably unambiguous and there's no dynamic runtime in play) and it can be integrated well.
Toolchain quality (error reporting, built in testing, awareness of primitives like "libraries", etc.) is also a huge strong point.
We're reasonably confident that we can use safe Rust as is, with strong guidance on how to do unsafe Rust.
For a tangible investigation of that space, PolySync has a project that has a look at MISRA rules from a Rust perspective. https://github.com/PolySync/misra-rust/blob/master/MISRA-Rul...
Ada is a good example here: the language has not evolved something like MISRA-C (it has evolved SPARK for formal verification, but I see that differently).
- Resources for learning C/C++ coming from a Rust background