awesome-security-GRC
crev
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awesome-security-GRC | crev | |
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2 | 12 | |
526 | 387 | |
- | 1.8% | |
1.7 | 1.8 | |
3 months ago | over 2 years ago | |
- | - |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
awesome-security-GRC
crev
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Hard disk LEDs and noisy machines
In other cases it may be more documented, such as Golangs baked-in telemetry.
There should be better ways to check these problems. The best I have found so far is Crev https://github.com/crev-dev/crev/. It's most used implementation is Cargo-crev https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev, but hopefully it will become more required to use these types of tools. Certainty and metrics about how many eyes have been on a particular script, and what expertise they have would be a huge win for software.
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50% new NPM packages are spam
Looks like there's an implementation of it for npm: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
I've been willing to try it for a while for Rust projects but never committed to spend the time. Any feedback?
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NPM repository flooded with 15,000 phishing packages
If you don't know the author, signatures do nothing. Anybody can sign their package with some key. Even if you could check the author's identity, that still does very little for you, unless you know them personally.
It makes a lot more sense to use cryptography to verify that releases are not malicious directly. Tools like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] allow you to trust your colleagues or specific people to review packages before you install them. That way you don't have to trust their authors or package repositories at all.
That seems like a much more viable path forward than expecting package repositories to audit packages or trying to assign trust onto random developers.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev [2]: https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch [3]: https://github.com/mozilla/cargo-vet
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Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
I don't think it makes much sense to verify pypi authors. I mean you could verify corporations and universities and that would get you far, but most of the packages you use are maintained by random people who signed up with a random email address.
I think it makes more sense to verify individual releases. There are tools in that space like crev [1], vouch [2], and cargo-vet [3] that facilitate this, allowing you to trust your colleagues or specific people rather than the package authors. This seems like a much more viable solution to scale trust.
[1]: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
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The Python Package Index (PyPI) warns of an ongoing phishing campaign to steal developer credentials and distribute malicious updates.
Crev?
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Vetting the Cargo
Alternatives to cargo-vet that has been mentioned before here on HN:
- https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
- https://github.com/vouch-dev/vouch
Anyone know of any more alternatives or similar tools already available?
- Crev – Socially scalable Code REView and recommendation system
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Compromising Angular via expired NPM publisher email domains
I plug this every time, but here goes: https://github.com/crev-dev/crev solves this by providing code reviews, scales via a web-of-trust model, and relies on cryptographic identities. That way, you can depend on a package without having to trust its maintainers and all future versions.
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Attempt at building a multi-platform UI project (with cross-compiling)
I understand your worries about the number of dependencies you're "forced" to use, however, most of them tend to be doing something that's both non-trivial and useful for more than a single project. As for being able to trust all your transitive dependencies, well, that's something that the Crev project is trying to address, although I don't believe that has gained much traction yet.
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CII' FOSS best practices criteria
It's good that having a reproducible build process is a requirement for the Gold rating, as is signed releases.
Perhaps there needs to be a Platinum level which involves storing the hash of each release in a distributed append-only log, with multiple third parties vouching that they can build the binary from the published source.
Obviously I'm thinking of something like sigstore[0] which the Arch Linux package ecosystem is being experimentally integrated with.[1] Then there's Crev for distributed code review.[2]
[0] https://docs.sigstore.dev/
[1] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
[2] https://github.com/crev-dev/crev
What are some alternatives?
Smart-Contract-Audits - Smart Contract security audit reports
pacman-bintrans - Experimental binary transparency for pacman with sigstore and rekor
tern - Tern is a software composition analysis tool and Python library that generates a Software Bill of Materials for container images and Dockerfiles. The SBOM that Tern generates will give you a layer-by-layer view of what's inside your container in a variety of formats including human-readable, JSON, HTML, SPDX and more.
auto-crev-proofs
comply - Compliance automation framework, focused on SOC2
secimport - eBPF Python runtime sandbox with seccomp (Blocks RCE).
threagile - Agile Threat Modeling Toolkit
cargo-vet - supply-chain security for Rust