ssh-mitm
ssh-mitm
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ssh-mitm | ssh-mitm | |
---|---|---|
42 | 2 | |
1,214 | 1,581 | |
1.6% | - | |
8.8 | 0.0 | |
9 days ago | almost 3 years ago | |
Python | C | |
GNU General Public License v3.0 only | GNU General Public License v3.0 or later |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
ssh-mitm
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Terrapin-Attack Style Vulnerability Likely Exploited for 2 Years
I wanted to share some insights into a security concern that echoes the Terrapin-Attack scenario, highlighting a similar vulnerability that has been observed in other tools.
Recently, I came across a Pull Request on GitHub for the SSH-MITM tool, which sheds light on a critical aspect of SSH protocol security, specifically regarding RFC 4253 during the KEXINIT process. The Pull Request, available at GitHub https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/pull/163, describes the necessity of discarding certain packages during the KEXINIT phase to prevent issues with intercepted clients.
Moreover, a look into the GitHub Blame for SSH-MITM reveals that these crucial changes in the KEXINIT step were integrated into SSH-MITM about 1-2 years ago. You can see the specific changes at this link: https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/blame/4fc3ef418847c35d17d0c427e2701b33a03c323c/sshmitm/workarounds/transport.py#L178-L188
An important note to add is that this information suggests that a similar form of attack, akin to the Terrapin-Attack, could potentially have been exploited for the last two years. This raises significant concerns about the historical vulnerability of systems to such attack techniques and emphasizes the importance of retroactive security analysis in addition to ongoing vigilance.
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Terrapin Attack for prefix injection in SSH
There is now an issue ticket in ssh-mitm to discuss the similarities between ssh-mitm and terrapin attack: https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/issues/165
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Check if a publickey is known by GitHub or Gitlab without iterating all users
During some audits, it's likely that you find some ssh public keys laying around on some servers.
If you want to verify if this key is known by other services, but you don't have access to those services, this task might be hard.
SSH-MITM has an additional command, which allows to check if a public ssh key is known by GitHub, GitLab, and other code hosters. It's not limited to GitHub and other major platforms and even works with each service, which is accessible over SSH.
First you must install SSH-MITM. It's recommended to use the AppImage, because this works out of the box on most Linux machines.
$ wget https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/releases/latest/download/ssh-mitm-x86_64.AppImage
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Should SSH-MITM add a Codehoster user check as a default setting?
SSH-MITM is a tool to audit ssh sessions and protocols, which uses SSH as the transport protocol: https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm
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Python API Documentation created with ChatGPT
you can find the project on github: https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm
- SSH-MitM has prebuilt windows executables
- SSH-MitM's new logo is a fish (OpenSSH's logo) on a hook
- SSH-MitM – Support for OpenSSH's Certificate Authority Planned
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SSH-MITM - Support for OpenSSH's certificate authority planned
You should check the Revisionhistory of the Readme file first.. https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/commit/564028af25c395528446fbb679c7392469d59bfd
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SSH-MitM 2.0.0 – Licence change to GPLv3
The “customized wording” you’re seeing is “The LGPL”. It’s a different license from the GPL.
The history on the repo shows that the original license was GPL (June 2020), the author changed the license to LGPL (December 2022), and now they’re changing it to GPL again. https://github.com/ssh-mitm/ssh-mitm/commits/master/LICENSE
ssh-mitm
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Awesome Penetration Testing
SSH MITM - Intercept SSH connections with a proxy; all plaintext passwords and sessions are logged to disk.
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Which tool to use for SSH man in the middle attacks
Hello,
at my university, we are learning, how to use ssh for server administration.
We learned, that ssh is secure, but there are some tools, which allows man in the middle attacks on ssh.
I found following tools:
* https://github.com/jtesta/ssh-mitm - most starred, but uses an outdated OpenSSH version and it's complicated to setup :-(
What are some alternatives?
cowrie - Cowrie SSH/Telnet Honeypot https://cowrie.readthedocs.io
mitm-omegle - Watch strangers talk on Omegle (man in the middle attack explained for kids)
docker-sshd - Minimal Alpine Linux Docker image with sshd exposed and rsync installed
pyrdp - RDP monster-in-the-middle (mitm) and library for Python with the ability to watch connections live or after the fact
sftpretty - Provides multi-threaded routines and high level protocol abstractions for a pretty quick & simple file transfer experience. Drop in replacement for pysftp.
super-auto-pets - A tool to allow for viewing of arbitrary Super Auto Pets replays
aws-gate - Better AWS SSM Session manager CLI client
mitm - 👨🏼💻 A customizable man-in-the-middle TCP intercepting proxy.
openssh-portable - Portable OpenSSH
SSLproxy - Transparent SSL/TLS proxy for decrypting and diverting network traffic to other programs, such as UTM services, for deep SSL inspection