semgrep VS jdk8u

Semgrep OSS Owner/Maintainer: Semgrep Age: First release on GitHub on February 6th, 2020 License: GNU Lesser General Public License v2.1

Semgrep - https://semgrep.dev

For the SAST stage, I used SonarQube tool. SonarQube is an open-source platform developed by SonarSource for continuous inspection of code quality to perform automatic reviews with static analysis of code to detect bugs and code smells on more than 30 programming languages. I preferred SonarQube instead of other SAST tools because it has a detailed documentation and plugins about integration with Jenkins and SonarQube works with Java projects pretty well. Of course you can similar multi-language-supported tools such as Semgrep or language-specific tools such as Bandit.

> Not sure I understand your point.

The problem is using Treesitter (for syntax highlighting and "semantic movements") and an LSP at the same time. So if your language has a LSP, using Treesitter additionally is redundant at best and introduces inconcistency at worst.

I'm not talking about using Treesitter as the parser for the LSP.

> Most popular languages have language-specific tools

I'd say even less popular langauges like Coq^H^H^HRocq, Lean 4, Koka, Idris, Unison, ... have their "own" tools, I do not know of a language that uses a Treesitter parser in its LSP, but I do know about tools like https://semgrep.dev/ (written in OCaml) and Github's code search which use Treesitter.

Well, when I seach for "semgrep", I get a very nice corporate landing page with a "Book Demo" button. Which is a level of hassle that just isn't worth it for smaller teams, because "Book Demo" usually means "We're going to try to do a dance to see how much money we can extract from you." Which smaller teams may only want to do for a handful of key tools.

(4 years ago, I was more willing to put up with enterprise licensing. But in the last two years, I've seen way too many enterprise vendors try to squeeze every penny they can get from existing clients. An enterprise sales process now often means "Expect 30% annual price hikes once you're in too deep to back out.")

There's also an open source "semgrep" project here: https://github.com/semgrep/semgrep. But this seems to be basically a vulernability scanner, going by the README.

Whereas AST-grep seems to focus heavily on things like:

1. One-off searching: "Search my tree for this pattern."

2. Refactoring: "Replace this pattern with this other pattern."

AST-grep also includes a vulnerability scanning mode like semgrep.

It's possible that semgrep also has nice support for (1) and (2), but it isn't clearly visible on their corporate landing page or the first open source README I found.

7. Semgrep

This project is a compilation of Semgrep rules derived from the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) specifically for Android applications. The aim is to enhance and support Mobile Application Penetration Testing (MAPT) activities conducted by the ethical hacker community. The primary objective of these rules is to address the static tests outlined in the OWASP MASTG.

Would an atomic mutable subclass cache (not sure what it's used for, downcasting?) be unnecessary in a language built around static rather than dynamic dispatch by default, like C/C++/Rust and perhaps Go? Or would it still speed up dynamically dispatched code, but is less practical or worthwhile so it isn't used in practice? (Though Rust's Arc also suffers from atomic contention similar to this blog post, when used across dozens of threads: https://pkolaczk.github.io/server-slower-than-a-laptop/)

Also it's somewhat ironic that the JVM source code (https://github.com/openjdk/jdk8u/blob/jdk8u352-b07/hotspot/s...) says "This code is rarely used, so simplicity is a virtue here" at the site of a bottleneck.

Use the latest JDK (Developer's Kit) or JRE (Runtime Environment) for Java 8, compiled and distributed by AdoptOpenJDK from the official Read-Only source.

The majority of the work on 8u, 11u, 17u releases happens in OpenJDK upstream, in so called JDK Updates Projects, by engineers from the interested JDK vendors. You can get a peek who does this kind of work from the repository histories, for example the most recent 11.0.13 is done by engineers from Red Hat (including yours truly), SAP, Azul, Microsoft, BellSoft, Tencent, Amazon, Alibaba, IBM, ARM, Google.

> whatever it returned would just get inserted as a string into the log output, no big deal.

Once you can inject anything that gets resolved, you have an information disclosure vulnerability unrelated to the RCE.

If I can just DNS resolve any ${env} variable from the JVM, a lot of systems are compromised by just exposing the env or system variables configured for runtime.

Just getting your $AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and $AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY env vars can compromise your bucket (sure, that is a really unsafe setup now, but it was almost the standard a few years ago over configuring it explicitly).

So a logging system which will merely resolve a hostname derived from a variable was bad enough to compromise many systems.

The serialization loophole was fixed in a jdk8 update.

https://github.com/openjdk/jdk8u/commit/006e84fc77a582552e71...

But even with that in place, the information disclosure of java System or env properties is bad enough to break actual systems in prod.

> Turns out, by including "." in some part of the URL to this remote class, Log4j lets off its guard & simply looks up to that server and dynamically loads the class file.

No it doesn't. That was disabled by default in 2009, and was disabled by default in every release of Java 8 or later: https://github.com/openjdk/jdk8u/commit/006e84fc77a582552e71...

Unless i am mistaken, i don't believe the attack as described by LunaSec actually works against a default-configured JVM released any time in the last decade.