runc VS runtime-spec

I can speak to this. Containers, and by extension k8s, break a well known security boundary that has existed for a very long time - whether you are using a real (hardware) server or a virtual machine on the cloud if you pop that instance/server generally speaking you only have access to that server. Yeh, you might find a db config with connection details if you landed on say a web app host but in general you still have to work to start popping the next N servers.

That's not the case when you are running in k8s and the last container breakout was just announced ~1 month ago: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/G... .

At the end of the day it is simply not a security boundary. It can solve other problems but not security ones.

It's interesting that, in light of things like this, you still see large software companies adding support for new components written in non-memory safe languages (e.g. C)

As an example Red Hat OpenShift added support for crun(https://github.com/containers/crun) this year(https://cloud.redhat.com/blog/whats-new-in-red-hat-openshift...), which is written in C as an alternative to runc, which is written in Go(https://github.com/opencontainers/runc)...

Rabbit hole indeed. That wasn't related to my job at the time, lol. The job change came with a company-provided computer and that put an end to the tinkering.

BTW, I found my hacks to make runc run on Chromebook: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/main...gabrys...

being the main author of crun, I can clarify that statement: I am not a fan of Go _for this particular use case_.

Using C instead of Go avoided a bunch of the workarounds that exists in runc to workaround the Go runtime, e.g. https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontaine...

runc

Not OP, but if I had to guess, a lot of this can be picked up by just observing common security issues in the Linux space, since similar mistakes and oversights have caused quite a few real-world CVEs in the past, e.g. this random example of a TOCTTOU vulnerability in runc.

> Well, no. When people say "containers", they always mean "Docker".

Not really/necessarily. https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec

Otras iniciativas empezaron a surgir debido a la alta popularidad de los containers y debido a esto, en 2015 se crea OCI(Open Container Initiative) para definir un estandar para containers(runtimes e imagenes).

Theoretically there could be a lot of new options that pop up. There is an Open Container Initiative that has a Runtime Specification that can be implemented. youki is one example of an OCI-compliant container runtime.

Open Container Initiative Runtime Specification aims to specify the configuration, execution environment, and lifecycle of a container. Source

How I can generate oci bundle that can be run with systemd-nspawn? I've tried podman/buildah push, but generated directory/archive is not an oci bundle (https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/blob/main/bundle.md). I've tried podman image mount, but config.json file is nowhere to be found. It looks like I am missing something simple.

In more detail, runC and youki need to implement this specification. https://github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec

A runtime specification that describes how to unpack and run a container. OCI maintains a reference implementation called runc. Both containerd and CRI-O use runc in the background to spawn containers.

The immediate goal of this project(youki) is to pass all the default tests of the runtime-spec that the opencontainers is making. Of course, this is for my own learning, but I believe Rust is one of the best languages to implement a container runtime.