me_cleaner VS sill

Some times Intel version of Lenovo have a problem with Intel ME , check this out. LINK

Yes; there are several ways, depending heavily on the version, and ranging from most trustworthy to least trustworthy:

* By patching the ME firmware itself - see the me_cleaner project, and methods documented here: https://puri.sm/posts/deep-dive-into-intel-me-disablement/ . This is Pretty Reliable; the runtime code has been deleted from flash.

* By setting a bit in the flash configuration, assumed to be added for the US High Assurance program: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bi... , https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/disabling-intel-m... . This is Mostly Reliable; the mechanism has been fairly aggressively reverse engineered and was added for a program with strict requirements.

* By sending an HECI command that says "hey ME, turn off your runtime" https://review.coreboot.org/c/coreboot/+/52800 . This is Somewhat Reliable; the method is well understood and seems to work but I'm not sure someone has done a deep dive audit into whether it could be re-enabled somehow.

"...this is interesting is because POWER9 is basically the first time the public got a real view of how sophisticated the backstage cast actually is of a modern server CPU."

Not quite correct; the OpenSPARC T1 and T2 were publicly released and available by 2008.

https://www.oracle.com/servers/technologies/opensparc.html

"Large parts of this process are handled by vendor-supplied mystery firmware blobs, which may as well be boxes with “???” written in them.

The maintainers of the me_cleaner script likely have the clearest view of what is known.

https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner

Your dedicated laptop with disabled Intel ME running OpenBSD might be the gold standard choice for your hardware wallet. Main discussion here.

I consider a dedicated laptop with deactivated Intel ME running OpenBSD (maybe from USB flash) can be a much secure alternative to a proprietary hardware wallet connected to your casual multi-purpose laptop.

On a side note, if Intel has made it this hard to disable Intel ME, is the US government happy with this change? It was them who got the HAP bit part working, and I do not see any news suggesting they have another trick to disable Intel ME. Should I just assume that this still works? Has anybody here tried? And does me_cleaner still work (last updated in 2018: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner)?

This is incorrect. Intel ME has an internal disablement mechanism: https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/wiki/HAP-AltMeDisable-bit this is the mechanism that it used by S76 and Purism.

If you are sensitive about the Intel Management Engine, the original Core 2 Duo/Quad systems are the last where it could be fully disabled.

Anything later will forcibly shut down after 30 minutes if (at least a fragment of) Intel's closed & bug-ridden monitoring code is not present.

I ran me_cleaner on a few of these systems, and I do all my finances with them running OpenBSD (usually on q9550s).

Yes, this effort to run old hardware is worth it for me. Below are the bios images that I was able to produce:

https://github.com/corna/me_cleaner/issues/233

True. However, sometimes large buyers, such as governments or enterprises, change their policies towards purchasing requirements. For example, since 2013 France has had an Inter-Ministry Foundation of Free Software[0], which provides the preferred software to be used across France's government, as French law requires preference be given to free software (logiciel libre).

What impact might occur if a government like France were to require in the future only RISC V architectures with free boot loaders, of if the US government or a large corporation required use of measured boot to see at boot-time if the boot code or subsequent OS had been compromised?

With persistent threat actors and the falling price of processing power, I wouldn't be surprised if in the next ten years some larger organizations (or tens of thousands of small businesses) start demanding this kind if IT security from their vendors.

[0] (in French, of course) https://sill.etalab.gouv.fr/fr/software and their repo, https://github.com/disic/sill.