libsodium VS TextSecure

Libsodium has been around for a while, so probably the reason it was posted is that version 1.0.19 was just released: https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/releases/tag/1.0.19-RE...

Updated NuGet and Swift packages are going to be uploaded soon.

AEGIS-128X and 256X are not there yet, but if you need them, they are available in libaegis: https://github.com/jedisct1/libaegis

All the code from libaegis will eventually be merged into libsodium, including the incremental update API which is especially useful for TLS.

To address both of these vulnerabilities, you should instead use a library that handles these sharp edges for you. A well received library in the security and cryptography communities is libsodium. It has high level functions that handle password hashing and data encryption for you, reducing the risk that you introduce vulnerabilities in your code, such as you have here.

Can anyone recommend between Librandombytes and libsodium ramdombytes?

https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/tree/master/src/libsod...

Feature request submitted to libsodium: https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/issues/1191

This article [0] has a good explanation of why clamping is necessary. But the process is very simple, you just generate 256 random bits, clear the three lowest order to avoid small subgroup attacks, then clear the highest order and set the second highest order to avoid side-channel attacks which may occur if an implementation isn’t constant-time. The Libsodium source shows this pretty clearly: [1], lines 18-23.

0: https://www.jcraige.com/an-explainer-on-ed25519-clamping

1: https://github.com/jedisct1/libsodium/blob/master/src/libsod...

Finally I managed to replace the slow pure-Python reference implementation of Ed25519 cryptography with pynacl which is a binding to libsodium, the industry standard lightning-fast C library.

Moxie's reasons for disallowing Signal distribution via F-droid always rang a little flat to me ( https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/127 ). Lots of chatter about the supposedly superior security model of Google Play Store, and as a result fewer eyes independently building and testing the Signal code base. Everyone is entitled to their opinions, but independent and reproducible builds seem like a net positive for everyone. Always struggled to understand releasing code as open source without taking advantage of the community's willingness to build and test. Looking at it in a new light after the XZ backdoor, and Jia Tan's interactions with other FOSS folk.

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/7409

> We've discussed at length why this is not possible, but if you have more thoughts then please visit the forums. Please try not to open duplicate issues in the future, even if you feel like something is important.

I wonder why this is "not possible"

Signal has documentation on how to reproduce their Play Store builds and compare them with what you've installed locally:

https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reprod...

There's nothing on Signal blog as of yet, but Signal's git repository was tagged with v7.0.0 yesterday and we can see from the commit history since the previously tagged version (v6.74.4) that there will be a setting to hide one's phone number [1], as well as disabling the previous default behavior of advertising that one is on Signal to all their contacts already using it [2].

[1] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/commit/8797236b5... (PNP stands for "Phone Number Privacy")

[2] https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/commit/6097e6c30...

Signal works the same but without the user tracking from Meta/Facebook. Many people use it as well but I'm surprised that a majority sticks to WhatsApp.

Telegram and Signal solve this.