grin VS research-lab

Only XMR and GRIN. Everything else lacks transactional uniformity, or is centralized corpo garbage, or both!

GRIN is a decentralized privacy-focused cryptocurrency that uses a technology called Mimblewimble to provide users with strong privacy protections. Mimblewimble is a type of blockchain protocol that allows for confidential transactions without revealing any identifying information about the sender, receiver, or transaction amount. In the Mimblewimble blockchain, there are no identifiable and reusable addresses. The users generate one-time use addresses for each transaction, which helps prevent address reuse and makes it more difficult to link transactions to specific users. A Mimblewimble block can be treated as one large transaction not a combination of individual transactions. This makes it difficult to trace individual transactions as no information about individual transactions is revealed. Transaction information is only known by the transaction's participants. The privacy-focused coin, Beam, also uses Mimblewimble to provide its users with confidential transactions.

Grin https://grin.mw/ is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that uses the Mimblewimble protocol to keep transactions confidential. GRIN has a strong community following and has seen growing adoption in recent years.

Could someone explain to me exactly what these errors are and if it is possible to complete the installation? https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin

i challenge now to build this! https://github.com/mimblewimble/grin

Not if there is NO Adresses and Amounts ツ

Superiority of ''Uncensorable'' crypto payments.

Use GRIN

One of many open research questions u/Rucknium has listed here (under "Reducing or eliminating 10 block lock with acceptable drawbacks"). There is a chance of it being reduced but its "complicated"

https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/raw/master/wh...

Welcome! I wrote this list of Monero's open research questions: https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/94

We also established an official list of topics we want to fund, expanding on the broad space of Monero. This is intended to help people realize actual tasks they may want to complete on behalf of Monero, rather than just the idea of tasks, and extends Monero's open research questions. We're further interested in security proofs, ensuring Monero's integrity, historic and present, and work on arithmetic-circuit based membership proofs. Arithmetic-circuit based membership proofs would remove ring signatures, and the statistical analysis possible on them, entirely, for complete privacy of which output you're spending.

There is actually something called a "truncated address", which is transparent by default. It is mentioned in the original CryptoNote whitepaper on page 8, but I don't think the official wallet software supports it. You could emulate it by calculating the view key manually as a = H(B).

Monero's privacy (i.e. fungibility) guarantees, while being extremely good, are still not mature enough to ossify the protocol yet, see here;