crates.io VS cargo-crev

So, be sure to double-check your critical libraries and be sure their alternatives exist in the Rust ecosystem. There’s a good chance the crates you need are available in Rust's crates.io repository.

The previous section was very simple, this section is also very simple but introduces us to cargo which is Rust's package manager, as a JS dev my mind goes straight to NPM.

Now, there has to be a place where all these packages come from. Similar to npmjs registry, where all node packages are registered, stored and retrieved, Rust also has something called crates.io where many helpful packages and dependencies are registered.

Before proceeding, let's check https://crates.io/, the official Rust package registry.

The most thrilling aspect has been the joy of writing the backend. It's like every struct, enum, and method in Rust forms this interconnected Multiverse of code , which you can see in crates.io which is best Documentation experience I Ever Had.

5. Crates.io

When using crates from eg. crates.io, and also things like std and core

Vendoring your packages was very tedious to even remotely get to work with Cargo. I spent a very long time getting Cargo to work together with cargo-local-registry. We vendor crates from crates.io and a custom internal registry.

So this is my question: Which way was the right to find it out? There is no info about this feature on crates.io. I also have no clue what exactly it does and why it is named rwh_05.

Rust does it so much better with https://crates.io . I don't know why Go can't (or won't) do something similar.

In other cases it may be more documented, such as Golangs baked-in telemetry.

There should be better ways to check these problems. The best I have found so far is Crev https://github.com/crev-dev/crev/. It's most used implementation is Cargo-crev https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev, but hopefully it will become more required to use these types of tools. Certainty and metrics about how many eyes have been on a particular script, and what expertise they have would be a huge win for software.

The main problem the author is talking about is actually about version updates, which in Maven as well as crates.io is up to each lib's author, and is not curated in any way.

There's no technical solution to that, really. Do you think Nexus Firewall can pick up every exploit, or even most? How confident of that are you, and what data do you have to back that up? I don't have any myself, but would not be surprised at all if "hackers" can easily work around their scanning.

However, I don't have a better approach than using scanning tools like Nexus, or as the author proposes, use a curated library repository like Debian is doing (which hopefully gets enough eyeballs to remain secure) or the https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev project (manually reviewed code) also mentioned. It's interesting that they mention C/C++ just rely on distros providing dynamic libs instead which means you don't even control your dependencies versions, some distro does (how reliable is the distro?)... I wonder if that could work for other languages or if it's just as painful as it looks in the C world.

For instance, the worst company imaginable may be in charge of software that was once FOSS, and they may change absolutely nothing about it, so it should be fine. However, if a small update is added that does something bad, you should know about it immediately.

The solution seems to be much more clearly in the realm of things like crev: https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev/

Wherein users can get a clear picture of what dependencies are used in the full chain, and how they have been independently reviewed for security and privacy. That's the real solution for the future. A quick score that is available upon display everytime you upgrade, with large warnings for anything above a certain threshold.

The metrics on crates.io are a useful sniff test, but ultimately you need to review things yourself, or trust some contributors and reviewers. Some projects, like cargo crev or cargo vet can help with the process.

You can use cargo-geiger or cargo-crev to check for whether people you trusted (e.g. u/jonhoo ) trust this crate.

There is a similar idea being explored with https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev - you trust a reviewer who reviews crates for trustworthiness, as well as other reviewers.

[cargo-crev](https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev) looks like a good step in the right direction but not really commonly used.

'cargo crev' makes this kind of workflow possible: https://github.com/crev-dev/cargo-crev

The crev folks themselves are no fans of PGP but need a way to security identify that you are in fact the review author, so that's where the id generation comes in. Ultimately crev is just a bunch of repos with text files you sign with IDs. The nice property is that you can chain these together into a web of trust and it's unfortunate that vet doesn't just use the same signed files on repos model as a foundation because even if they don't trust anyone else, we could turn around and trust them.