certificate-transparency
subfinder

certificate-transparency | subfinder | |
---|---|---|
11 | 9 | |
855 | 11,096 | |
- | 5.0% | |
0.0 | 9.1 | |
over 1 year ago | 9 days ago | |
C++ | Go | |
Apache License 2.0 | MIT License |
Stars - the number of stars that a project has on GitHub. Growth - month over month growth in stars.
Activity is a relative number indicating how actively a project is being developed. Recent commits have higher weight than older ones.
For example, an activity of 9.0 indicates that a project is amongst the top 10% of the most actively developed projects that we are tracking.
certificate-transparency
-
Google Pixel Binary Transparency: verifiable security for Pixel devices
Recently I developed a presentation about immutability as a design concept in computer security. As part of it, I have slides which cover Certificate Transparency implementation[0], which uses Trillian[1] as a distributed ledger. Part of Trillian's documentation includes a Firmware Transparency[2] example. For the year or so I've been aware of it, I've thought that it's a great idea, and wondered if it would ever grow as a project/practice. Digging through the links in this announcement, it appears Trillian is the basis for the distributed ledger here. Glad to see the idea has been taken further by Google.
[0] https://certificate.transparency.dev/
[1] https://transparency.dev/
[2] https://github.com/google/trillian-examples/tree/master/bina...
-
Google and HTTP
> They could say that your certificate passes validation while, in fact, said security has been already tampered with on your side, giving your website's visitors a sense of false security.
This isn't how the Web PKI works. In order to tamper with your site's traffic, Let's Encrypt (or another CA) would need to issue another certificate for your site with a key that they (rather than you) control. This would be detected via CT[1], which your browser (unless it's Firefox) is already using
And note: by design, any CA in the trusted set can already do this, regardless of whether you use them or not. The things that are stopping them are that it's (1) not in their interest to do so, (2) it's detectable due to CT, and (3) would result in their root being hell-banned by the browsers.
[1]: https://certificate.transparency.dev/
-
Let's Encrypt Acme API Outage
You are correct: https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency/blob/mast...
You can embed CT attestations (SCTs) in the certificate itself, so yes, provided the CA is in cooperation with CT log operators, and deliberately does the pre-certificate -> SCTs -> real certificate dance, it is possible for a browser to validate embedded SCTs without an online check.
However, that assumes that the CA actively does that, they don't have to. Neither does the server. What's compelling them to is _policy_, set by Google and Apple, that their respective browsers won't accept certificates _without_ CT attestations. Google's policy specifically requires that one of the SCTs on a certificate must be a CT log run by Google. Google also controls the list of CT logs that Chrome will consider as valid CT logs, as part of deciding if an SCT is valid. Antitrust, anyone?
I was trying to make a similar point about Firefox - policy vs code. And rather than saying that it's specifically the CA/Browser Forum setting policy (which it does, but only baseline policy, which does not include CT), each org in the CA/Browser Forum has their own root cert inclusion program with their own policies, that all draw from baseline policy then add to it. You are right, _baseline_ policy does not require CT....
... and neither does _Mozilla's_ policy, now I've scanned through it. It actively acknowledges that CT exists (in that it mandates that if you issue a precertificate for CT, you _must_ issue the completed certificate), but it does _not_ require CAs to use CT. In stark contrast to Google and Apple.
Perhaps this is why they also don't implement CT checking in Firefox?
- 2024. január 1-től minden magyarnak jár a 'magyarországi' IP-cím
- Security for your Homeserver
- We updated our RSA SSH host key
-
Can authenticated internet-facing web app be discovered if not indexed by search engines?
My main source is Certificate Transparency, which is kind of a database of TLS certs created so far. But use external tools like Subfinder or Amass.
-
Evidence regarding Ristonia/Windias "FBI seizures"
Certificates signed by reputable Certificate Authorities (CA's) are publicly logged by projects like googles certificate transparency, the EFF's SSL observatory and a few CA's directly, which can be viewed on websites like https://crt.sh/ and https://ui.ctsearch.entrust.com/. We will use screenshots of the latter service for readability, but you can verify the same information on the first service as well.
-
I make the same mistake too, sometimes.
The one saving grace is that Certificate Transparency makes it so that false issuances are logged. CT is now required by the big 3 browser vendors. CAs caught wrongly issuing certs without good explanation have their CA cert(s) removed or revoked. (Though sometimes more slowly than I'd like.)
-
Does signal have web based interface?
I'm not sure what you're talking about. I imagine you mean certificate transparency. Certificate transparency is not available on all browsers (FF doesn't support it), and only enables detectong issuance of malicious certificates/misbehaving CAs, but does not prevent the certificate being from being actually used. This means that a compromised CA could still issue malicious certificates and use them to attack many people before anyone notices it and the malicious certificates are revoked.
subfinder
- Subfinder: Fast passive subdomain enumeration tool
-
Subdomain.center – discover all subdomains for a domain
https://github.com/projectdiscovery/subfinder does this, but it explains all the methods and lets you choose to only do a passive scan.
-
Introducing Goctopus: open-source, state-of-the-art GraphQL endpoint discovery & fingerprinting tool.
Subdomain Enumeration: Goctopus uses DNS records APIs via subfinder to enumerate subdomains.
-
Subdomain enumeration.
Subfinder
-
Can authenticated internet-facing web app be discovered if not indexed by search engines?
My main source is Certificate Transparency, which is kind of a database of TLS certs created so far. But use external tools like Subfinder or Amass.
- Como saber todos os domínios que uma empresa tem?
- How to find out domain names registered by a particular domain registrar?
-
Intellingence-Resources
Subfinder - https://github.com/projectdiscovery/subfinder
-
Subdomain Enumeration
The best CLI tool for finding subdomains is subfinder. It is made by ProjectDiscovery who creates really powerful tools. They recently got funded $1.7 million so that the devs could work full time on developing and maintaining these tools.
What are some alternatives?
libsqlfs - a library that implements a POSIX style filesystem on top of an SQLite database
amass - In-depth attack surface mapping and asset discovery
mod_md - Let's Encrypt (ACME) in Apache httpd
assetfinder - Find domains and subdomains related to a given domain
github-keygen - Easy creation of secure SSH configuration for your GitHub account(s)
httprobe - Take a list of domains and probe for working HTTP and HTTPS servers
trillian-examples - A place to store some examples which use Trillian APIs to build things.
breach-parse - A tool for parsing breached passwords
ssh
subby - An uber fast and simple subdomain enumeration tool using DNS and web requests with support for detecting wildcard DNS records.
zlint - X.509 Certificate Linter focused on Web PKI standards and requirements.
graphinder - 🕸️ Blazing fast GraphQL endpoints finder using subdomain enumeration, scripts analysis and bruteforce. 🕸️
