ClojureDart VS slsa

> "ClojureDart is production-ready: you can ship applications right now.

Source: https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart

See a live demo here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dqBeGpuedf0

ClojureDart is very similar to ClojureScript, which the GP is already comfortable with.

Ah, and there is also a new version of Clojure in active development - ClojureDart. It is a port of Clojure language to Dart with the primary goal of using Flutter framework and getting a native mobile and desktop UI.

There is a port of the Clojure language to Dart with Flutter support: https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart

Now https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart exist to build GUI with flutter.

There are ways, but it is generally a lot of work, for example there is ClojureDart https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart . Though unusually that sort of thing is normal for Clojure, because it is a hosted language (Clojure -> JVM, ClojureScript -> JS, etc).

Something to checkout for mobile and desktop is: https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart

Basically, you take a programming language and make it work on a platform that meant to be programmed using a different PL. Clojure is hosted by design - it's not Java, but can be used to program for JVM. It ain't Javascript, but can be used to target nodejs and browser; not an [official] CLR language, but you can write .Net programs. You can use Clojure to make Flutter apps with ClojureDart. You can integrate Python into Clojure with libpython-clj. Or write Clojure to target Erlang/OTP; or Rust; or R; There's even a clojure-like language for Lua - Fennel.

There's something about Clojure people like so much, they want it to work atop any platform.

https://github.com/Tensegritics/ClojureDart

https://github.com/clj-python/libpython-clj

https://github.com/clojerl/clojerl

https://github.com/clojure-rs/ClojureRS

https://github.com/scicloj/clojisr

https://fennel-lang.org

What about ClojureDart with Flutter? One codebase for ios/android/web/windows/linux/osx

Short answer: not where it counts.

My work focuses on recognizing known functions in obfuscated binaries, but there are some papers you might want to check out related to deobfuscation, if not necessarily using ML for deobfuscation or decompilation.

My take is that ML can soundly defeat the "easy" and more static obfuscation types (encodings, control flow flattening, splitting functions). It's low hanging fruit, and it's what I worked on most, but adoption is slow. On the other hand, "hard" obfuscations like virtualized functions or programs which embed JIT compilers to obfuscate at runtime... as far as I know, those are still unsolved problems.

This is a good overview of the subject, but pretty old and doesn't cover "hard" obfuscations: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=1566145.

https://www.jinyier.me/papers/DATE19_Obf.pdf uses deobfuscation for RTL logic (FGPA/ASIC domain) with SAT solvers. Might be useful for a point of view from a fairly different domain.

https://advising.cs.arizona.edu/~debray/Publications/generic... uses "semantics-preserving transformations" to shed obfuscation. I think this approach is the way to go, especially when combined with dynamic/symbolic analysis to mitigate virt/jit types of transformations.

I'll mention this one as a cautionary tale: https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/2886012 has some good general info but glosses over the machine learning approach. It considers Hex-rays' FLIRT to be "machine learning", but FLIRT just hashes signatures, can be spoofed (i.e. https://siliconpr0n.org/uv/issues_with_flirt_aware_malware.p...), and is useless against obfuscation.

Eventually I think SBOM tools like Black Duck[1] and SLSA[2] will incorporate ML to improve the accuracy of even figuring out what dependencies a piece of software actually has.

[1]: https://www.synopsys.com/software-integrity/software-composi...

[2]: https://slsa.dev/

The dependency chain is certified! SLSA!

The things you mentioned are not solved by a typical "SBOM" but e.g. CycloneDX has extra fields to record provenance and pedigree and things like in-toto (https://in-toto.io/) or SLSA (https://slsa.dev/) also aim to work in this field.

I've spent the last six months in this field and people will tell you that this or that is an industry best practice or "a standard" but in my experience none of that is true. Everyone is still trying to figure out how best to protect the software supply chain security and things are still very much in flux.

It's multi-pronged and I imagine adopters may use a subset of features. Broadly, I think folks are going to be interested in a) branch/tag/reference protection rules, b) file protection rules (monorepo or otherwise, though monorepos do pose a very apt usecase for gittuf), and c) general key management for those who primarily care about Git signing.

For those who care about a and b, I think the work we want to do to support [in-toto attestations](https://github.com/in-toto/attestation) for [SLSA's upcoming source track](https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa/issues/956) could be very interesting as well.

It doesn't have to be. Corporations which are FedRAMP[1] compliant, have to build software reproducibly in a fully isolated environment, only from reviewed code.[2]

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FedRAMP

[2] https://slsa.dev/

SLSA stands for Supply chain Levels for Software Artifacts, and it is a framework that aims to provide a set of best practices for the software supply chain, with a focus on OSS. It was created by Google, and it is now part of the OpenSSF. It consists of four levels of assurance, from Level 1 to Level 4, that correspond to different degrees of protection against supply chain attacks. Our CTO Paolo Mainardi mentioned SLSA in a very good article on software supply chain security, and we also mentioned it in another article about securing OCI Artifacts on Kubernetes.

The Supply chain Levels Software Artifact(SLSA) puts a security framework in place that each software build can follow, ensuring the integrity of the built artifact.

I’ve documented some thoughts on trying to abide by SLSA level-1 for a package I maintain on the AUR. The idea here is to have some kind of accountability of “look, I’m doing the right things for maintaining these packages”.

Maybe something like SLSA could solve your issue https://slsa.dev/ the idea is to create a metadata standard so that packages can provide build providence information. So public build systems like github actions can sign a manifest explaining what build actions were executed and what the input and output of those actions are. That way you could verify a package was built from a specific set of sources with a specific set of build actions without requiring reproducibility. This assumes you trust the public build system not to lie though.

- Do you have some horror stories to share? (outside Log4j of course)

Would love to have some insight on that, and the company size (number of employees etc)

[1]: https://slsa.dev/